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ABSTRACT
This Article argues that applying patent-like doctrine to design makes sense
only for a design patent system premised on a patent-like conception of
cumulative progress that permits patent examiners and courts to assess whether a
novel design reflects a nonobvious step beyond the prior art. If there is a
meaningful way to speak of such an inventive step in design, then design patent
doctrine should be based on that conception. But if nonobviousness has no
sensible meaning in design, then a patent system cannot work for design. At
present, design patent doctrine is in disarray because it is unmoored from any
conceptual underpinnings. Design patents are not needed to incentivize
technological innovation, because that kind of innovation is the subject of utility
patent law. Because aesthetic expression is not susceptible of an “inventive step”
judgment, progress in aesthetic expression is not appropriately incentivized by a
patent-like system. Indeed, copyright long has rejected the very possibility of
incentivizing aesthetic progress with a “creative step” requirement because it
has found no metric along which to measure aesthetic progress.
If there is any type of cumulative progress to be sought in design it must
therefore involve the interplay between aesthetics and utilitarian function.
Aesthetics and utility intersect at the integration of form and function and that, we
argue, is where design patents must be justified, if they can be justified at all.
Once stated, this point is intuitively appealing. The integration of form and
function is what distinguishes industrial design both from purely artistic
expression (for which we have copyright) and from technological invention (for
which we have utility patent). The converse also follows: if there is no workable
means to assess the nonobviousness of a given design’s integration of form and
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function, there can be no sensible design patent system.
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INTRODUCTION
Design patents are hot. Applicants are seeking design patents at record
rates, and design patents are increasingly important parts of companies’ patent
portfolios. Indeed, design patents are at the heart of the multibillion dollar
“smartphone war” between Apple and Samsung. One reason for the growing
importance of design patents is that, since about 1990, they appear to have
become substantially easier to obtain than utility patents. About 10% of patents
issued by the PTO since 1990 have been design patents.1 Until recently,
however, design patents have received little scholarly attention. As a result, a
number of basic theoretical questions remain unanswered. Indeed, in our view,
no persuasive first-principles justification for design patents has been offered.
In this Article, we begin to address the most foundational theoretical

1. Prior to 1990, the ratio of design patents issued to design patent applications each
year roughly tracked the ratio for utility patents. In 1990, however, the ratio of issued design
patents to applications jumped from 50% to 70% and averaged 77% between 1990 and 2012.
During the same period, the ratio for utility patents declined from about 60% to about 45%.
Consequently, the ratio of design patents issued to utility patents issued, which had hovered
near 6% since around 1960, jumped to about 10%, peaking at 16% in 2008. Over the period
from 1990 to 2013, approximately 10% of all issued patents were design patents. See Patent
Statistics, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. (Apr. 4, 2015, 5:19 PM), http://www.uspto.gov/
patents/stats/index.jsp (providing data on which these calculations are based).
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question: What are design patents for? Or, to be a bit more precise, when, if
ever, do patents make sense as incentives for “progress” in industrial design?
This is a vexing question because, while the Constitution tells us that patents
are intended to promote progress, the design patent system lacks a coherent
stated, or even implicit, conception of “progress.” Without such a conception,
and some sense of how it relates to the “progress” promoted by the copyright
and utility patent systems, it is difficult to determine the need for, or evaluate
the benefits of, design patent protection.
We argue that a cumulative notion of progress is deeply embedded in the
patent system, especially in the requirement of nonobviousness or “inventive
step.” Moreover, patent doctrine assumes that competition plays a dynamic role
in producing a baseline of innovation in addition to its static role of reducing
prices and increasing quality. Because of the cumulative nature of
technological progress, exclusive rights over obvious improvements create both
dynamic and static harms.
The copyright system’s focus on copying and its low “originality”
threshold for coverage reflect different underlying premises about how best to
incentivize “progress” in aesthetic expression.2 Copyright law makes no
attempt to assess the size or value of the “creative step” taken by an expressive
work. Moreover, copyright doctrine for the most part discourages, rather than
encourages, expression that builds on particular previous works. Where
copyright doctrine accommodates the need to incorporate aspects of earlier
creative work, it focuses on relatively general concepts. Overall, copyright
doctrine displays much less concern for the effects of more granular exclusivity
on dynamic progress. Instead, copyright doctrine promotes a conception of
progress based on quantity and variety of independently created works.3
Applying patent-like doctrine to design makes sense only if a design patent
system is premised on a patent-like conception of cumulative progress that
permits patent examiners and courts to assess whether a novel design reflects a
step of some magnitude beyond the prior art. If there is a meaningful way to
speak of an inventive step in design, then design patent doctrine should be

2. There are at least three ways one might look at this observation as a normative
matter. Perhaps there is no meaningful conception of “progress” in aesthetic expression, or at
least there are no judicially manageable standards for assessing such progress. Alternatively,
it might be that aesthetic progress exists but that its path is so unpredictable and long term
that it is too difficult to evaluate whether one work takes a bigger “creative step” than
another until long after the fact. Finally, it might be that copyright doctrine is simply
mistaken in this regard and society would benefit from some kind of “creative step”
requirement. For the most part, we assume in this discussion that one of the first two
perspectives is correct, though we comment briefly on how the analysis here might
contribute to the normative debate about copyright doctrine.
3. This is not to say that we are convinced that it is possible to design a copyright
system that maximizes quantity and variety overall, as opposed to maximizing the quantity
of particular kinds of works.
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based on that conception. If nonobviousness has no sensible meaning in design,
however, then a patent system makes no sense for design. At present, design
patent doctrine is in disarray because it is unmoored from any conceptual
underpinnings. It goes astray primarily for two reasons. First, design patent law
lacks a coherent mechanism for limiting the scope of its subject matter. While
courts attempt to distinguish design patent from utility patent by interpreting
the ornamentality requirement to rule out “functional” designs, this distinction
has never proven to be a stable one. Second, design patent law errs by
attempting to impose a nonobviousness requirement on primarily aesthetic
expression. The copyright system long has rejected the very possibility of
incentivizing aesthetic progress with such a “creative step” requirement
because it has found no metric along which to measure aesthetic progress. It is
no wonder that the design patent system’s attempt to impose such a
requirement has been an utter failure.
Our earlier question thus can be rephrased this way: Is there a form of
“inventive step” that a patent system might incentivize with respect to design?
Design patents are not needed to incentivize technological invention, because
that kind of innovation is the subject of utility patent law. And because
aesthetic expression is not susceptible of the same sort of “inventive step”
judgment, progress in aesthetic expression is not appropriately incentivized by
a patent-like system. If there is any type of cumulative progress to be sought in
design it must therefore involve the intersection between aesthetics and
utilitarian function. Aesthetics and utility intersect at the integration of form
and function, and that, we argue, is where design patents must be justified, if
they can be justified at all. Once stated, this point is intuitively appealing. The
integration of form and function is what distinguishes industrial design from
both purely artistic expression (for which we have copyright) and technological
invention (for which we have utility patent). Consequently, design patents
could fill a niche in the intellectual property system if progress in design can be
assessed in integrationist terms. The converse also follows: If there is no
workable means to assess the nonobviousness of a given design’s integration of
form and function, there can be no sensible design patent system.
Before we dive in, an important caveat is in order. Our suggestion that a
design patent system might sensibly focus on incentivizing nonobvious steps in
integrating form and function is preliminary. We take no position at this point
as to whether it is feasible to ground a nonobviousness inquiry on the
integration of form and function, or as to whether design patents are necessary
to incentivize progress in the integration of form and function. We thus take no
position as yet on the ultimate question of whether there should be a design
patent system at all. We do, however, argue that under current law and doctrine
the design patent system is doomed to fail. And we further argue that only by
focusing on the unique role design patent law could play can we actually
address the question of whether such a system is needed. One cannot ask
whether design patents are needed without asking what they would be needed
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for. As things currently stand, there is no coherent answer to that question.
Part I of this Article describes how particular conceptions of progress and
competition are embedded in the doctrines of patent, copyright, and trademark
law. Part II explores how those conceptions relate to the functionality doctrines
that apply at the intersections of these systems and discusses how they inform
the subject matter of design patent. Part III critiques the design patent system in
light of the conceptions of progress and competition reflected in other forms of
IP law, focusing especially on the design patent doctrine of nonobviousness. It
argues that, as a historical matter, the design patent doctrine’s lack of a
coherent conception of cumulative progress has put it on a treadmill in which
utilitarian aspects of design are repeatedly thrown out of the system only to reenter through the back door. Part IV argues that the integration of form and
function must be the focus of any theoretically coherent design patent system
and discusses some of the potential implications of such a focus.
I.

PROGRESS AND COMPETITION IN IP DOCTRINE

In this Part, we analyze the conceptions of progress and competition
reflected in patent, copyright, and trademark law. Specifically, we argue that
patent law embeds a cumulative conception of technological progress, which is
accompanied by a dynamic conception of competition. Copyright doctrine is
not focused on cumulative progress. Instead, it reflects an approach to progress
perhaps best described as “let a thousand flowers bloom.” In line with this
conception, copyright seeks to ensure that potential creators have access to a
palette of high level aesthetic elements, but it limits access to specific elements
of prior expressive works. Trademark law is concerned primarily with
facilitating static competition by ensuring that consumers are not misled about
the products and services they purchase. Importantly, however, we argue that
trademark law subordinates its static competition goals to the patent and
copyright systems’ judgments about how to encourage inventive and creative
progress and promote dynamic competition.
A. Progress and Competition in Patent Doctrine
Utility patent doctrine is shot through with the assumption that
technological progress is cumulative. Patent opinions repeatedly refer to the
patent system’s promotion of “improvements,” “advances,” “progress,” and the
solution of “problems.”4 Because of this conception of progress, patent doctrine

4. See, e.g., KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417, 419-20 (2007) (“[A]
court must ask whether the improvement is more than the predictable use of prior art
elements . . . . Granting patent protection to advances that would occur in the ordinary course
without real innovation retards progress . . . . One of the ways in which a patent’s subject
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is parsimonious, in that it is always cognizant of the need to balance incentives
between generations of inventors. While commentators and courts may
disagree strongly about what patentability standards would achieve the most
appropriate balance, there is widespread agreement that balance is necessary. A
few doctrinal examples will make the point.
Patent law’s disclosure requirement, implemented by the written
description and enablement doctrines, seeks to ensure that potential inventors
can learn from the previous work of others. But patent law does not reward
mere reinvention of the wheel. Not only are duplicative patents denied even to
independent inventors, but those independent inventors may be sued for
infringing others’ patents that cover their inventions.5
The cumulative notion of progress underlying the patent system is most
evident in the novelty and nonobviousness requirements. Because patentability
is judged with reference to prior art, inventors are encouraged to acquaint
themselves with pre-existing technology and to “design around” or build upon
it.6 The nonobviousness requirement (evocatively called “inventive step” in
most other jurisdictions7) adds a quantitative dimension to the patentability
determination. To be patentable, an invention must not only be different from

matter can be proved obvious is by noting that there existed at the time of invention a known
problem for which there was an obvious solution . . . .”). A LexisAdvance search of Federal
Circuit patent cases, for example, uncovered 725 opinions referring to “improvements,”
1,227 opinions referring to “advances,” 238 opinions referring to “progress,” and 579
opinions referring to “problems” in the same sentence as “solve” or “solution.” LexisNexis
Grp., LEXISADVANCE, https://advance.lexis.com/GoToExperienceBarPageResearch (last
visited Dec. 29, 2013) (log-in; then search for “improvements”; then filter by “Cases-Court:
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals” and “Practice Areas & Topics: Patent Law”; then repeat
the process for the search terms “advances,” “progress,” and “problems w/sent (solve or
solution)”).
5. Patent law thus expects potential follow-on inventors to search patent disclosures
before investing. The reasonableness of that expectation has been challenged, especially in
the information technology arena, and commentators have suggested various
accommodations for independent inventors who are not copyists. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley,
Should Patent Infringement Require Proof of Copying?, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1525 (2007);
Katherine J. Strandburg, Patent Fair Use 2.0, 1 UC IRVINE L. REV. 265 (2011); Samson
Vermont, Independent Invention as a Defense to Patent Infringement, 105 MICH. L. REV.
475 (2006). The 2011 American Invents Act included a very minimal prior user defense. See
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-29, sec. 5, § 273, 125 Stat. 284,
297-99 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 273 (2011)).
6. This is, of course, not necessarily to suggest that inventors do familiarize
themselves with prior art. In some cases the burden of doing so may seem insurmountable.
See Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 19.
7. See, e.g., Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
art. 27, § 1, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1197, 1208, available at http://www.wto.org
/english/tratop_e/trips_e/t_agm0_e.htm (“[P]atents shall be available for any inventions,
whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they . . . involve an
inventive step . . . .”).
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what has been done before, it must be “different enough.”8
Patent law’s comfort with assessing the “size” of technological advances
no doubt stems not only from a recognition of the importance of cumulative
invention, but also from the fact that it is reasonably feasible. We often can
agree on how to assess technical improvement—the computer runs faster, has
more memory, is cheaper or more durable, etc. Patent doctrine has backed
away from requiring that a patentable invention be “better” than what came
before, largely rejecting the notion that patent examiners and courts can, as a
practical matter, accurately assess the potential commercial or social benefits of
particular inventions.9 However, the focus on technological advance does not
reflect a retreat from patent law’s cumulative conception of progress. Even if
we do not think it is possible at the time of patenting to evaluate the amount
that a particular step contributes to the public good over the long term, it is
sensible to believe that denying patents to technologically obvious changes is
likely to result in greater progress.10 That belief continues to permeate both
doctrine and rhetoric.
The notion of cumulative progress turns patents into double-edged swords,
leading to doctrinal obsession with balancing the needs of current and future
inventors. If progress is cumulative, it will not be enough for follow-on
inventors to learn from and then “design around” earlier inventions. In many
cases, they will need to incorporate aspects of earlier inventions into their own
inventive output. Thus, inventors may patent “improvements” that incorporate
earlier patented inventions11 without any authorization from earlier patentees.12
8. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 427 (holding the claimed adjustable gas pedal with electronic
sensor obvious in light of prior art adjustable gas pedals and prior art electronic sensors
because the combination was “well within the grasp of a person of ordinary skill in the
relevant art”).
9. Courts have made this clear in modern utility cases, in contrast to earlier cases in
which courts would deny patentability because the claimed invention was no better than the
prior art. See, e.g., Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 528-36 (1966) (finding a patent was
rightfully denied on utility grounds).
10. That we see technical progress over time does not tell us, of course, that such
progress can be attributed to patent law particularly, since we cannot know how much
improvement we would have seen without the availability of patent law.
11. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2011) (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and
requirements of this title.” (emphasis added)); see also 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON
PATENTS, § 1-GLOS (Matthew Bender, 2011) (“An inventor may patent an improvement on
an existing product or process []whether or not it is patented . . . . An invention claimed in
one patent may require for its practice use of another invention claimed in another patent. In
such a case of blocking patents, common subject matter may be used only with the
concurrent authority of both patent owners.”).
12. In this situation, the later inventor may not be able to use her invention without
incurring liability, but neither can the earlier inventor use the improvement without
infringing the later inventor’s patent.
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The assumption is that such “blocking patents” will lead to socially beneficial
licensing agreements.13 Blocking patents impose costs on downstream
inventors, however, and patent doctrine attempts to lower the costs for followon inventors in various ways. For example, utility patents have a relatively
short twenty-year-from-application term14 and expire earlier if maintenance
fees are not paid.15
Most importantly, patent doctrine protects follow-on inventors by seeking
to award patents only when they are needed. This goal underlies the
nonobviousness requirement. The denial of patents for insufficient advances
reflects an assumption that “ordinary innovation” will occur without the need
for a patent incentive—competition (and other motivations) will produce a
dynamic baseline level of technological progress without any need for
exclusive rights. The nonobviousness doctrine thus seeks to reserve patents
only for those inventions that reflect “ingenuity and skill” beyond that of the
“ordinary mechanic.”16 As the Supreme Court explained in KSR v. Teleflex, its
most recent opinion on nonobviousness:
We build and create by bringing to the tangible and palpable reality around
us new works based on instinct, simple logic, ordinary inferences,
extraordinary ideas, and sometimes even genius. These advances, once part of
our shared knowledge, define a new threshold from which innovation starts
once more. And as progress beginning from higher levels of achievement is
expected in the normal course, the results of ordinary innovation are not the
subject of exclusive rights under the patent laws. Were it otherwise patents
might stifle, rather than promote, the progress of useful arts.17

Because cumulative innovation depends as much on the availability of
unpatented technology for use by inventors as it does on protection for
nonobvious advances, patent doctrine seeks to ensure untrammeled access to
obvious and otherwise unpatentable advances. Thus, for example, patents may

13. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining
Breakdown: The Case of Blocking Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV. 75 (1994); Robert P. Merges &
Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839,
860-61 (1990). There are various problems with the assumptions underlying the blocking
patents approach, as discussed by one of us in earlier work, see Strandburg, supra note 5, but
the point for present purposes is that this doctrine reflects a theory of progress as cumulative
advance.
14. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (patents expire twenty years after date the application was
filed).
15. 35 U.S.C. § 41(b)(2) (“Unless payment of the applicable maintenance fee under
paragraph (1) is received in the Office on or before the date the fee is due or within a grace
period of 6 months thereafter, the patent shall expire as of the end of such grace period.”)
16. Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248, 267 (1850); see also Michael
Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, The Inducement Standard of Patentability, 120 YALE L.J.
1590 (2011) (arguing that the nonobviousness requirement should be interpreted such that
only inventions for which a patent was necessary to induce the invention are patentable).
17. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 427 (2007).
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be challenged by litigants and invalidated years after they were issued.18
Moreover, states are preempted from offering patent-like protection to
inventions that are unpatentable under federal law.19
These are just a few examples of patent law’s concern with the balance
between generations of inventors, which runs throughout the doctrine.20
Indeed, surprisingly few patent doctrines focus on static competition. We
assume that, because patents are relatively short in duration, products
embodying inventions will eventually become available at competitive prices.
Given the pace and cumulative nature of technological change, however, the
expiration of one patent often leaves users not with access to unpatented
products, but with access to new and improved patented products. Drugs are
obviously a potential exception here,21 though pharmaceutical companies do
their best to market patented “improvements.”22 Likewise, patent law pays very
little attention to users. The relatively few and weak exemptions that might
benefit users are aimed at promoting follow-on invention,23 and compulsory
licensing is strongly disfavored.24 Subject matter doctrines precluding the

18. See, e.g., United States v. Glaxo Grp. Ltd., 410 U.S. 52, 69 (1973) (“[T]here is a
public interest favoring the judicial testing of patent validity and the invalidation of specious
patents.”); Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969) (noting “public interest” in
invalidating patents so as to permit “full and free competition in the use of ideas which are in
reality a part of the public domain”)
19. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 152 (1989).
States may, however, offer trade secret protection to undisclosed inventions that might be
patentable subject matter. Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257 (1979). The
legitimacy of that protection is directly related to the undisclosed nature of the invention,
however.
20. This is an observation, rather than a normative endorsement, of course.
21. See, e.g., Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, TRIPS and Essential Medicines: Must One Size
Fit All? Making the WTO Responsive to the Global Health Crisis, in INCENTIVES FOR
GLOBAL PUBLIC HEALTH: PATENT LAW AND ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL MEDICINES (Thomas
Pogge, Matthew Rimmer & Kim Rubenstein eds., 2010); Smita Narula, The Rights-Based
Approach to Intellectual Property and Access to Medicine: Parameters and Pitfalls, in
BALANCING WEALTH AND HEALTH: GLOBAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND THE BATTLE OVER
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES IN LATIN AMERICA (Rochelle Dreyfuss
& César Rodríguez Garavito, eds., forthcoming March 2014), manuscript available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1923299.
22. See, e.g., WORLD HEALTH ORG., WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG. & WORLD
TRADE ORG., PROMOTING ACCESS TO MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES AND INNOVATION:
INTERSECTIONS BETWEEN PUBLIC HEALTH, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND TRADE 131 (2012),
available at http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/freepublications/en/global_challenges
/628/wipo_pub_628.pdf.
23. See 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2011) (exempting medical and surgical procedures from
liability); Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (limiting the
experimental use defense to cases in which the defendant’s use is for purely philosophical
inquiry).
24. The Supreme Court’s decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388
(2006) altered the balance here to some extent since it reinforced that injunctions would not
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patenting of abstract ideas, natural phenomena, and products of nature also
seem to aim primarily at facilitating downstream invention,25 though they may
play some role in facilitating static competition by assuring that certain “basic
tools” are available to all market participants.26
B. Progress and Competition in Copyright Law
Copyright law, despite having the same constitutional mandate to promote
“progress,” takes a very different approach. Basic copyright doctrine does not
incentivize authors to be aware of others’ work or to strive to design around or
build upon it. To the contrary, since copyrights are infringed only by copying
(and not by independent creation), the doctrine may even incentivize authors to
avoid awareness of others’ work.27 Certainly, copyright law rewards
independent creation. Whereas patent law allows, and perhaps even
encourages, inventors to build upon others’ work by awarding “blocking
patents” on improvements, copyright currently incorporates an exclusive right
to make “derivative works” that actively discourages authors from building on
others’ previous works. Under § 103(a), “protection for a work employing
preexisting material in which copyright subsists does not extend to any part of
the work in which such material has been used unlawfully.”28 Thus, rather than
award a “blocking copyright,” the Copyright Act denies protection to
unauthorized derivative works even when those works add considerable
originality.29 Copyright’s long (and growing) term of protection similarly
automatically issue in patent cases. See id. at 393-94.
25. See Katherine J. Strandburg, Much Ado About Preemption, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 563
(2013) (discussing and critiquing the Supreme Court’s patentable subject matter doctrine and
its relationship to downstream innovation); Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & James P. Evans, From
Bilski Back to Benson: Preemption, Inventing Around, and the Case of Genetic Diagnostics,
63 STAN. L. REV. 1349 (2011) (same); Mark A. Lemley et al., Life After Bilski, 63 STAN. L.
REV. 1315 (2011); see also Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct.
2107, 2116 (2013) (“Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not
patentable. . . . As the Court has explained, without this exception, there would be
considerable danger that the grant of patents would tie up the use of such tools and thereby
inhibit future innovation premised upon them.”).
26. See, e.g., Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3255 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“Business methods
are . . . the basic tools of commercial work.” (emphasis omitted)); Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Are
Business Method Patents Bad for Business?, 16 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J.
263, 276-77 (2000) (arguing that patents on business methods disrupt the competitive
market).
27. Many have suggested that this is precisely what happens in the software industry,
where companies put their developers in “clean” rooms and hope they will not become
aware of other code. See, e.g., Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Strict Liability and Its
Alternatives in Patent Law, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 799, 814-15 (2002).
28. 17 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2011).
29. See, e.g., Bucklew v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co., LLP., 329 F.3d 923, 930 (7th
Cir. 2003) (finding infringement because “[v]ariants that result from tinkering with a copied
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suggests a relative lack of concern that later creators might need to incorporate
earlier expression into their work.30
Nor does copyright doctrine contain anything analogous to patent law’s
nonobviousness requirement. The threshold for copyrightability is
“originality,” which the Supreme Court has interpreted to mean only that “the
work was independently created by the author (as opposed to copied from other
works), and that it possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity.”31
These are not difficult requirements to meet. According to the Court, “the
requisite level of creativity is extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice.
The vast majority of works make the grade quite easily, as they possess some
creative spark, ‘no matter how crude, humble or obvious’ it might be.”32 To put
it plainly, originality does not entail difference. “Originality does not signify
novelty; a work may be original even though it closely resembles other works
so long as the similarity is fortuitous, not the result of copying.”33
These pervasive differences between patent and copyright doctrine reflect
fundamentally different intuitions about the ways in which expressive and
inventive creativity function and how they benefit society. As Barton Beebe has
persuasively argued, we have never had a good metric for evaluating progress
of the fine arts.34 Copyright doctrine thus appears designed to encourage a
profusion of independent works, rather than works that incorporate and build
upon the work of previous authors. Perhaps the implicit theory is that
promoting the independent expressions of a large, diverse group of creators will
benefit society by appealing to a wide variety of aesthetic sensibilities.35 Or
form are derivative works from that form, and it is a copyright infringement to make or sell a
derivative work without a license from the owner of the copyright on the work from which
the derivative work is derived”); Anderson v. Stallone, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (C.D.
Cal. 1989) (finding Anderson’s “treatment” for Rocky IV not to be copyrightable because it
was an unauthorized derivative of the Rocky characters).
30. Copyright for any work created after January 1, 1978 endures for the life of the
author plus 70 years. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a). Copyright in works made for hire endure for the
shorter of 95 years from the date of publication or 120 years from the date or creation.
§ 302(c).
31. Feist Pub’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
32. Id. (quoting 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 1.08[C][1] (1990)).
33. Id. at 345-46 (“To illustrate, assume that two poets, each ignorant of the other,
compose identical poems. Neither work is novel, yet both are original and, hence,
copyrightable.”).
34. Barton Beebe, Bleistein, Copyright Law, and the Problem of Aesthetic Progress
13-14 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).
35. There is, of course, a major debate about whether the current contours of copyright
are appropriate to its purpose, whether its current scope of protection is necessary to produce
a socially beneficial profusion of creative expression, and the extent to which later creative
expression should be permitted to appropriate and build upon earlier expression. We mention
those debates here for the most part only in passing and certainly do not intend to take a
position on them in this Article. Our point is simply that the two doctrinal channels reflect
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perhaps the underlying notion is that the most valuable expression is created by
a “romantic author” whose work is guided not by reference to the work of
others, but by attending to an internal muse. Whatever the reason, copyright
law seems to have settled on a quantitative, rather than a qualitative, conception
of progress.
Equally importantly, courts have concluded that is impossible to measure
the extent to which a particular combination of previous expression has
advanced over the prior works. As the Supreme Court stated more than one
hundred years ago, in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.:
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to
constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations,
outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits. At the one extreme some
works of genius would be sure to miss appreciation. Their very novelty would
make them repulsive until the public had learned the new language in which
their author spoke. It may be more than doubted, for instance, whether the
etchings of Goya or the paintings of Manet would have been sure of protection
when seen for the first time. At the other end, copyright would be denied to
pictures which appealed to a public less educated than the judge. Yet if they
command the interest of any public, they have a commercial value—it would
be bold to say that they have not an aesthetic and educational value—and the
taste of any public is not to be treated with contempt.36

Consistent with its interest in promoting quantity and variety, copyright
law is unforgiving (particularly as compared with patent law) regarding
incorporation of prior work. Specifically, copyright doctrine permits creators to
use high level aesthetic conceptions from previous works, primarily through the
idea-expression doctrine and related concepts of merger and scènes à faire.37
But these doctrines do not allow use of more particular expression, exempting
only stock characters, plot types, and relatively high-level ideas from copyright
protection.38
very different theories of “progress.”
36. 188 U.S. 239, 251-52 (1903).
37. See, e.g., Bucklew v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co., LLP, 329 F.3d 923, 929-30
(7th Cir. 2003) (“[A] copyright owner can’t prove infringement by pointing to features of his
work that are found in the defendant’s work as well but that are so rudimentary,
commonplace, standard, or unavoidable that they do not serve to distinguish one work within
a class of works from another.”); Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d
Cir. 1930) (Upon any work . . . a great number of patterns of increasing generality will fit
equally well, as more and more of the incident is left out. . . . [T]here is a point in this series
of abstractions where they are no longer protected, since otherwise the playwright could
prevent the use of his “ideas,” to which, apart from their expression, his property is never
extended.”).
38. A second thread of idea-expression doctrine distinguishes copyrightable
expression from uncopyrightable facts and methods. See, e.g., Feist Pub’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel.
Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340 (1991); Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 516 U.S. 233
(1996) (per curiam) (mem), aff’g 49 F.3d 807, 815 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding that a computer
menu command hierarchy is an uncopyrightable “method of operation”); Baker v. Selden,
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Copyright’s fair use doctrine also reflects this conception of progress as
profusion. The statute sets out four factors to be considered in determining
whether a use is fair:
(1) The purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) The nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) The amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) The effect of the use upon the potential market for, or value of, the
copyrighted work.39

For the most part, these factors focus on whether the use in question
disrupts the copyright holder’s present market for the existing work, rather than
on the value of building on that existing work. Indeed, the Supreme Court has
stated that effect upon the original author’s potential market is “the single most
important element of fair use.”40
One potential exception to this static focus is “transformative use.” While
the copyright statute defines an infringing derivative work as one which
“recast[s], transform[s], or adapt[s]” preexisting works,41 courts have recently
interpreted the first statutory fair use factor to favor “transformative uses” of
preexisting works.42 For the most part, “transformative use”-based fair use has
not aimed to promote “progress” by the incorporation of previous works. While
transformativeness is sometimes used to protect free speech interests, courts’
analyses in these cases tend to turn on the extent to which the defendant’s use
“usurps” the (static) market for the original work. Thus, uses that critique,
parody, or otherwise “comment on” an existing work generally are deemed
“fair” because courts assume that those uses do not substitute for the original,
even if they might affect demand for it.43 In other cases, courts have used

101 U.S. 99, 100-01 (1879) (“Where the truths of a science or the methods of an art are the
common property of the whole world, an author has the right to express the one, or explain
and use the other, in his own way.”). This thread is related to the boundary between the
coverage of patent and copyright. See, e.g., Baker, 101 U.S. at 102-03.
39. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2011).
40. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985). The
Court has since tried to soften that statement, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S.
569, 591 (1994), but the effect on the market continues to dominate in most cases. See
Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978-2005, 156 U.
PA. L. REV. 549, 587 (2008) (“It is certainly interesting to observe, now based on empirical
evidence, that the outcome of the fourth factor appears to drive the outcome of the test, and
that the outcome of the first factor also appears to be highly influential.”).
41. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2011).
42. See, e.g., Beebe, supra note 40, at 404-06.
43. See, e.g., Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579-81; Brownmark Films, LLC v. Comedy
Partners, 682 F.3d 687, 693-94 (7th Cir. 2012); Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268
F.3d 1257, 1268-69 (11th Cir. 2001). To the extent courts’ conclusions that parodies do not
substitute for the original are meant to be empirical rather than normative, it is not clear they

001--MCKENNA & STRANDBURG_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

14

STANFORD TECHNOLOGY LAW REVIEW

2/27/2014 9:55 AM

[Vol. 17:1

“transformativeness” to preclude liability for uses that seem far removed from
incentives to create new expressive works, such as the use of thumbnail images
in search results.44
Several recent cases involving “appropriation art” are particularly
instructive regarding copyright’s conception of progress. These cases are
interesting because, while copyright generally assumes that a profusion of new
works is possible as long as relatively high-level concepts are available to new
creators, appropriation art is defined by its reuse of earlier works.45 In some of
these cases, courts have used “transformative use” as a hook for finding a fair
use right to reuse specific pieces of prior expressive works. But even in these
cases we can see stark differences between copyright and patent, since courts in
these cases focus on transformation and difference rather than on improvement
and advance.
Blanch v. Koons, for example, involved a piece entitled “Niagara” by Jeff
Koons, a “visual artist” whose “work has been exhibited widely in museums
and commercial galleries.”46 Koons based Niagara on a collage of images, one
of which was from a photograph used in an advertisement for Gucci sandals. In
finding fair use, the court noted that the doctrine “mediates” between “the
property rights [copyright law] establishes in creative works, which must be
protected up to a point, and the ability of authors, artists, and the rest of us to
express them—or ourselves by reference to the works of others . . . .”47
Specifically regarding the transformativeness of Koons’s use, the court
concluded that Koons had a “genuine creative rationale for borrowing Blanch’s
image.”48 Koons and Blanch (the owner of the copyright in the photograph)
had “sharply different objectives” in creating their works, with Koons using
Blanch’s photograph as “fodder for his commentary on the social and aesthetic
consequences of mass media” rather than merely “repackag[ing]” it.49 The
court described the transformation from “a fashion photograph created for
publication in a glossy American ‘lifestyles’ magazine” into “part of a massive
painting commissioned for exhibition in a German art-gallery space.”50
are necessarily correct. See Bruce P. Keller & Rebecca Tushnet, Even More Parodic than the
Real Thing: Parody Lawsuits Revisited, 94 Trademark Rep. 979, 995-96 (2004) (noting that
the claim that owners would not license parodies is demonstrably false in at least some
cases). Thus, transformativeness is likely serving interests other than market preemption,
even if not entirely transparently.
44. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1164-68 (9th Cir. 2007).
45. Appropriation art is not alone in this respect. Entire categories of music are based
on combining digital samples of earlier works. See generally PETER DICOLA, CREATIVE
LICENSE: THE LAW AND CULTURE OF DIGITAL SAMPLING (2011).
46. 467 F.3d 244, 246 (2d Cir. 2006).
47. Id. at 250.
48. Id. at 255.
49. Id. at 253.
50. Id.
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Similarly, in Cariou v. Prince,51 the Second Circuit granted summary
judgment of fair use with respect to 25 pieces of appropriation art that were
based on photographs. The court opined that the defendant’s artwork was
transformative because it “manifest[ed] an entirely different aesthetic” than the
original photographs.52 While the original photographs were “serene and
deliberately composed,” the appropriation works were “crude and jarring,”
“hectic and provocative.”53
And finally, in Morris v. Guetta,54 the court summarized the fair use
standard for appropriation art in this way: “[a]n artist is not required to
compromise his or her artistic vision merely because the artist could have made
a similar statement in a non-infringing way. However, the artist must provide a
sufficient justification for using another’s copyrighted material in effecting the
artist’s vision.”55 In Morris, however, the court’s “independent review”
concluded that Guetta’s appropriation art, which was based on Morris’s
photographs of Sid Vicious of the Sex Pistols, was not sufficiently
transformative.56 According to the court, Vicious was “making a distinct facial
expression” in Morris’s photo, and Guetta’s works showed the same
expression.57 Though Guetta had added “certain new elements,” his works
“remain[ed] at their core pictures of Sid Vicious,” which did not convey
“sufficient new meaning” to be transformative.58 The “new elements” Guetta
introduced included “higher black and white contrast,” “less subtle detail,”
“splashes of brightly colored paint,” “sunglasses,” “a backdrop with the
character Snoopy and palm trees,” a “mole on the image of the face . . . and an
overlay of blonde hair in a different style,” and being “made out of broken
vinyl records.”59
These cases are of interest to us here for two reasons. First, they nicely
illustrate Bleistein’s concern that it is a “dangerous undertaking for persons
trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth” of
aesthetic expression.60 Indeed, these decisions suggest that the courts may well
have fallen prey to exactly the kind of bias against popular taste that concerned

51. 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013).
52. Id. at 709.
53. Id. at 706. The court remanded for the district court to assess whether the

“relatively minimal alterations” to five additional photographs were sufficiently
transformative. Id. at 711.
54. No. LA CV12-00684 JAK (RZx), 2013 U.S. Dist. Lexis 15556 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 4,
2013).
55. Id. at *26.
56. Id. at *27-28.
57. Id. at *28.
58. Id.
59. Id. at *3-4.
60. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903).
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the Court in Bleistein, since “appropriation art” is often, though not always,
deemed fair use,61 while even minimal digital sampling (mostly for hip-hop
music) generally is not excused.62
Second, these cases illustrate the continued difference between patent law’s
cumulative conception of progress and copyright’s focus on quantity and
variety. Even when courts allow reuse of specific pieces of prior expression,
they do so because they focus on transformation and difference rather than on
improvement and advance. Patent law’s nonobviousness inquiry, which focuses
on whether the combination of prior elements would have emerged even in the
absence of intellectual property protection, simply has no purchase in this
context.
Thus, despite the recent appropriation art cases, we think that as a matter
either of principle or of practicality, the copyright system will continue for the
foreseeable future to be imbued with a conception of progress as quantity and
diversity.
C. Trademark and Competition
Unlike patent and copyright, trademark law does not focus on creativity or
innovation but instead on improving static competition by preventing certain
misleading uses of a trademark that might interfere with consumers’ purchasing
decisions.63 There are tradeoffs in trademark law’s pursuit of this goal. When
one producer is awarded exclusive rights to particular marks, others are
necessarily deprived of the use of those words, symbols, and so forth in
61. See, e.g., Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013); 467 F.3d 244 (2d Cir.
2006); Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003).
62. See, e.g., Bridgeport Music, v. UMG Recordings, 585 F.3d 267, 278 (6th Cir.
2009) (upholding jury verdict that use of short section from the song “Atomic Dog” in
“D.O.G. in Me” was not fair use, despite finding that “‘D.O.G. in Me’ is certainly
transformative (first factor), having a different theme, mood, and tone from Atomic Dog”);
Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 803 n.18 (6th Cir. 2005) (no de
minimis exception to copyright infringement for “the taking of a millisecond of sound from
another’s copyrighted recording, or the taking of a more extensive portion that has been
modified to the point of being completely unrecognizable or impossible to associate with the
copied recording”). But see Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1192 (9th Cir. 2003)
(finding no infringement of underlying musical composition in case where sound recording
was licensed).
63. See, e.g., Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 34
(2003) (“Federal trademark law ‘has no necessary relation to invention or discovery, but
rather, by preventing competitors from copying a source-identifying mark, reduce[s] the
customer’s costs of shopping and making purchasing decisions, and helps assure a producer
that it (and not an imitating competitor) will reap the financial, reputation-related rewards
associated with a desirable product.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted));
TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 34 (2001) (“The Lanham Act
does not exist to reward manufacturers for their innovation in creating a particular device;
that is the purpose of the patent law and its period of exclusivity.”).
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communicating with consumers about their own products. Many trademark
doctrines aim to police these tradeoffs between a mark’s value as an exclusive
indication of source and its broader communicative value. Thus, for example,
trademark law prefers marks that are “inherently distinctive” because
protection of those marks impinges less on communicative value.64 Descriptive
marks must acquire “secondary meaning” before they can receive legal
protection—meaning they must, over time, acquire source significance among
the relevant consuming public.65 Moreover, trademarks that are or become
“generic,” in that they are used to identify a type of product rather than its
source, are never protected.66 The descriptive and nominative fair use doctrines
recognize the value to consumers of communicative and critical uses of
otherwise protected marks,67 and courts use a variety of tools to insulate certain
uses from liability because of free speech concerns.68
Of particular relevance to design, trademark law has recently become more
reticent to protect product design features. In general, trademark law extends
protection to at least two species of trade dress: product packaging and product
design. The Supreme Court, however, has expressed skepticism about the
likelihood that consumers will view product design primarily as an indicator of
source. According to the Court in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers,
Inc, product packaging, is used “most often to identify the product’s source of
the product.”69 By contrast, “[c]onsumer predisposition to equate [product
design features] with the source does not exist” because “[c]onsumers are
aware of the reality that, almost invariably, even the most unusual of product
designs—such as a cocktail shaker shaped like a penguin—is intended not to
identify the source, but to render the product itself more useful or more

64. See 2 J.T. MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 11:18 (4th ed. 2013).
65. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 211 (2000) (“[A] mark
has acquired distinctiveness, even if it is not inherently distinctive, if it has developed
secondary meaning, which occurs when, ‘in the minds of the public, the primary significance
of a [mark] is to identify the source of the product rather than the product itself.’” (second
alteration in original) (quoting Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 851 n.11
(1982)).
66. MCCARTHY, supra note 64, § 12:1.
67. See KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 123
(2004) (holding that a descriptive use may be considered fair under 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4)
even in the face of some amount of confusion); Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Tabari,
610 F.3d 1171, 1775-83 (9th Cir. 2010) (applying the nominative fair use doctrine to insulate
from liability use of the Lexus trademark in the domain name “buyalexus.com”); see also
William McGeveran & Mark P. McKenna, Confusion Isn’t Everything, 89 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 253 (2013) (describing the importance of these defenses and advocating for doctrines
that protect these interests more effectively).
68. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 997-1002 (2d Cir. 1989); Louis Vuitton
Malletier S.A. v. Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc., 868 F. Supp. 2d 172, 174-75 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
69. 529 U.S. 205, 212 (2000).
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appealing.”70 As a result, unlike product packaging, which can be inherently
distinctive, trade dress protection is available for product design only upon a
showing of secondary meaning. This differential treatment is particularly
appropriate, according to the Court, because a producer “can ordinarily obtain
protection for a design that is inherently source identifying (if any such exists),
but that does not yet have secondary meaning, by securing a design patent or a
copyright for the design.”71
Trademark protection for design is also limited by the functionality
doctrine, which, like the useful article doctrine in copyright, refuses protection
to certain useful product features. As we describe in the next Section, the
functionality doctrine reflects trademark law’s subordination of its own static
competition goals to patent law’s dynamic competition goals.
II.

“FUNCTIONALITY” DOCTRINES: PROGRESS, COMPETITION AND THE
INTERSECTIONS BETWEEN IP REGIMES

Product design lies at the intersection of the patent, copyright, and
trademark regimes. Useful articles often have both utilitarian and aesthetic
aspects, and at times their features serve as source identifiers in the
marketplace. Patent, copyright, and trademark also have very distinct purposes,
as we have discussed in Part I: patent law seeks to promote cumulative
technological progress; copyright law seeks to promote quantity and variety of
expression; and trademark law seeks to prevent parties from misleading
purchasers about the source of their products. Each of these regimes balances
exclusive rights with untrammeled availability in a different way that reflects
its particular goals. When applied to product design, however, these regimes
can work at cross-purposes, necessitating doctrinal mechanisms to sort things
out. The primary means for doing so in the product design context are so-called
“functionality” doctrines.72 Unfortunately, these doctrines are confusing and
confused. We argue here that the analysis of Part I can be used both to make
sense of these doctrines and to critique them.
A. A (Utility) Patent Law Supremacy Principle
The primary principle underlying all of these doctrines (and the reason for
referring to these rather disparate rules as “functionality” doctrines) is what one
might call a “patent law supremacy” principle, or more particularly, a “utility

70. Id. at 212-13.
71. Id. at 214.
72. As mentioned earlier, see supra notes 37-38, copyright’s idea-expression

distinction also polices the boundary between patent and copyright, but we do not discuss it
in detail here.
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patent law supremacy” principle. Copyright, trademark, and design patent each
in their own way refuse protection to “useful” or “functional” features because
those features are the exclusive province of utility patent law. Put differently,
each of those systems subordinates its own policy goals to the dynamic
competition goals of utility patent law, reserving to utility patent the
responsibility for determining the circumstances under which utilitarian
features may be copied by others.
In copyright law, this principle goes back to the Supreme Court’s opinion
in Baker v. Selden, which held that copyright would not extend to useful
processes even if those processes were described in a work of authorship.73 As
the Court explained:
To give to the author of the book an exclusive property in the art described
therein, when no examination of its novelty has ever been officially made,
would be a surprise and a fraud upon the public. That is the province of
letters-patent, not of copyright. The claim to an invention or discovery of an
art or manufacture must be subjected to the examination of the Patent Office
before an exclusive right therein can be obtained; and it can only be secured
by a patent from the government.74

Only patent law, with its requirement of novelty and thorough examination
process, can be used to protect the system described in the book.75 And the lack
of patent protection means more than just that the inventor cannot prevent
others’ use via patent law—it means that the system “is open and free to the
use of the public,”76 a conclusion copyright law may not undermine. Patent
law’s primacy is due precisely to its cumulative view of technological progress,
which requires not only that patentees have exclusive rights to what is patented
but, equally importantly, that unpatented utilitarian elements remain available
for use.
The Supreme Court’s seminal 1954 Mazer v. Stein opinion77 also
highlights copyright’s deference to utility patent law in particular, and its
refusal to defer to design patent law. In Mazer, the Court held that statuettes
designed to be used as lamp bases were copyrightable based in part on the
conception of progress as diversity. Thus, the statuettes were copyrightable
“works of art” because “[i]ndividual perception of the beautiful is too varied a
power to permit a narrow or rigid concept of art.”78 But consistent with Baker

73. 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
74. Id. at 102.
75. The current statute expressly excludes from copyright protection “any idea,

procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless
of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.” 17
U.S.C. § 102(b) (2011).
76. Id. at 104.
77. 347 U.S. 201, 212-14 (1954).
78. Id. at 214.
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v. Selden’s concern about trenching on utility patent law, the Court emphasized
that copyright protection extended only to the expression embodied in the
statuettes, not to the ideas or “mechanical or utilitarian aspects” embodied in
them when used as lamp bases. The latter could be protected only by patents.79
In notable contrast, the Court expressly rejected the argument that the
statuettes should be denied copyright protection because the design of useful
articles was the subject matter of design patents.80 According to the Court,
“[n]either the Copyright Statute nor any other says that because a thing is
patentable it may not be copyrighted. We should not so hold.”81 This logic is,
of course, quite contrary to Baker v. Selden, where the fact that the system
potentially was patentable was precisely the reason the Court held that it could
not be copyrighted. Thus, the Court’s statement in Mazer can only be
understood as making a radical distinction between utility and design patents:
for the Court, copyright protection for useful features presents irreconcilable
conflict, while copyright for the design of articles of manufacture presents no
conflict at all.
The extension of copyright to expressive aspects of useful articles created a
difficult problem, however. How could the courts ensure that copyright did not
ensnare utilitarian elements? Courts have attempted to answer this question
with the doctrine of “separability,” a concept that has now been codified in the
Copyright Act.82 As the Second Circuit explained in Carol Barnhardt, Inc. v.
Economy Cover Corp.,83 “Congress has explicitly refused copyright protection
for works of applied art or industrial design which have aesthetic or artistic
features that cannot be identified separately from the useful article. Such works
are not copyrightable regardless of the fact that they may be ‘aesthetically
satisfying and valuable.’”84 The mannequins at issue in that case thus were not
copyrightable because their features could not “be conceptualized as existing
independently of their utilitarian function.”85

79. Id. at 212.
80. Id. at 217 (“We do hold that the patentability of the statuettes, fitted as lamps or

unfitted, does not bar copyright as works of art.”).
81. Id.
82. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (“[T]he design of a useful article, as defined in this section, shall
be considered a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only if, and only to the extent that, such
design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified separately
from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.”).
83. 773 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1985).
84. Id. at 418 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 55 (1976)).
85. Id.
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Mannequins at issue in Carol Barnhardt86

Brandir International, Inc. v. Cascade Pacific Lumber Co.87 addressed the
copyrightability of an aesthetically pleasing bike rack:

Bike rack at issue in Brandir88

The Second Circuit clarified that the requisite separability between aesthetic
and utilitarian elements could be either physical or conceptual, and it adopted a
test of conceptual separability that it derived from an article by Professor
Denicola: “[I]f design elements reflect a merger of aesthetic and functional
considerations, the artistic aspects of a work cannot be said to be conceptually
separable from the utilitarian elements. Conversely, where design elements can
be identified as reflecting the designer’s artistic judgment exercised

86. Id. at 425-26 figs.1, 2, 3 & 4.
87. 834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987).
88. JOANNE GERE, BRANDIR INT’L, INC., THE ORIGINAL RIBBON BIKE RACK, at 2 (2010)

(brochure), available
%20CATALOG.pdf.

at

http://www.ribbonrack.com/pdfs/01%20RIBBON%20RACK
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independently of functional influences, conceptual separability exists.”89
There is considerable debate about the proper test for conceptual
separability. Professor Nimmer’s treatise on copyright, for example, put it
somewhat differently: “conceptual separability exists where there is any
substantial likelihood that even if the article had no utilitarian use it would still
be marketable to some significant segment of the community simply because of
its aesthetic qualities.”90 And the district court in Pivot Point preferred
Professor Goldstein’s test: “a pictorial, graphic or sculptural feature
incorporated in the design of a useful article is conceptually separable if it can
stand on its own as work of art traditionally conceived, and if the useful article
in which it is embodied would be equally useful without it.”91 For present
purposes, however, the point is that, however formulated, copyright’s
separability doctrine is intended to ensure that utilitarian aspects of useful
articles are kept free from copyright exclusivity.
Trade dress protection for product design presents much the same issue.
Trade dress serves its source-indicating function only if its use is exclusive. On
the other hand, trade dress protection, like copyright, has the potential to extend
exclusive rights to unpatented utilitarian elements of an industrial design. This
might occur when patented aspects of a product’s appearance become signifiers
of source during the patent term, when the patentee is the exclusive provider of
the patented goods. In those circumstances, enforcing exclusive rights through
trade dress law undermines the balance contemplated by patent law, which
presumes that those useful features will pass into the public domain when the
patent expires. As the Court said in Singer Manufacturing Co. v. June
Manufacturing Co.:
It is self evident that the expiration of a patent the monopoly created by it
ceases to exist, and the right to make the thing formerly covered by the patent
becomes public property. It is upon this condition that the patent is granted. It
follows, as a matter of course, that on the termination of the patent there
passes to the public the right to make the machine in the form in which it was
constructed during the patent.92

89. Id. at 1145 (construing Robert C. Denicola, Applied Art and Industrial Design: A
Suggested Approach to Copyright in Useful Articles, 67 MINN. L. REV. 707, 709-17 (1983));
see also Pivot Point Int’l, Inc. v. Charlene Prods., Inc., 372 F.3d 913, 920-31 (7th Cir. 2004)
(surveying “the key stages of doctrinal development” in separability case law, and ultimately
applying Denicola’s conceptual separability test to conclude that the expression on a
mannequin’s face was entitled to copyright protection).
90. 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.08[B]
(2009), quoted in Pivot Point Int’l, Inc., 372 F.2d at 923; Carol Barnhart, 773 F.2d at 421.
91. Pivot Point, 372 F.3d at 917 (quoting 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES,
LAW & PRACTICE § 2.5.3, at 109 (1989)).
92. 163 U.S. 169, 185 (1896); see also Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111
119-20 (1938) (Where shredded wheat was made in a “pillow-shaped” form during the terms
of relevant utility and design patents, “upon expiration of the patents the form, as well as the
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Because “unpatented design and utilitarian conceptions” provide “the
baseline of free competition”93 that produces the “ordinary innovation” upon
which the patent incentive builds,94 trade dress law subordinates its static
competition goals to patent law’s dynamic goals. It does so now primarily
through the functionality doctrine, which polices the boundary between trade
dress and patent, declaring patent law’s competition norms supreme with
respect to certain features—only patent law can alter the competitive baseline
for functional features, with respect to which parties are otherwise free to
compete on price and quality even if those features indicate source.
In TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc.,95 the Court
emphasized that “[trade dress protection] does not exist to reward
manufacturers for their innovation in creating a particular device; that is the
purpose of the patent law and its period of exclusivity.”96 For this reason, “[a]
utility patent is strong evidence that the features therein claimed are functional
[and thus trade dress protection is unavailable].”97 Importantly, however, the
Court also made clear that the patent system trumped trade dress even for
unpatented utilitarian elements because “[a]llowing competitors to copy will
have salutary effects in many instances.”98 Thus, “[w]hether a utility patent has
expired or there has been no utility patent at all, a product design which has a
particular appearance may be functional because it is ‘essential to the use or
purpose of the article’ or ‘affects the cost or quality of the article.’”99 Patent
law, not trade dress law, determines whether a utilitarian element is available
for use by follow-on inventors, whether or not the element has ever been
patented, and it does so regardless of whether alternative designs are available
to reach the same utilitarian result.100 If technological progress depends on
cumulative invention, this “supremacy principle” is eminently reasonable.
There are other options available for indicating source to consumers—
including product packaging, labeling, and the like.

name, was dedicated to the public”).
93. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 156 (1989).
94. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 427 (2006).
95. 532 U.S. 23 (2001).
96. Id. at 34.
97. Id. at 29.
98. Id. at 29.
99. Id. at 35 (quoting Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10
(1982)).
100. Id. at 33-34 (“Here, the functionality of the spring design means that competitors
need not explore whether other spring juxtapositions might be used. The dual-spring design
is not an arbitrary flourish in the configuration of MDI’s product; it is the reason the device
works. Other designs need not be attempted.”).
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B. Grappling with the Interplay Between Trade Dress and Aesthetic
Expression
There is much less clarity regarding the scope of trademark protection for
aesthetic expression, whether or not that expression is protected by copyright.
In Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.,101 the Supreme Court
denied relief under the Lanham Act for the sale of a documentary film that was
essentially an unattributed edited version of a television program. The
television program had fallen out of copyright and into the public domain
because the copyright owner failed to renew.102 The Court decided the case by
narrowly construing the “origin of goods” language in § 43(a) of the Lanham
Act,103 holding that only confusion about the origin of tangible goods (rather
than regarding the origin of the creative content) counted for Lanham Act
purposes.104 But this construction was clearly motivated by a principle of
copyright supremacy. Citing Kellogg and TrafFix, the Court declared that
“[t]he right to copy, and to copy without attribution, once a copyright has
expired, like ‘the right to make [an article whose patent has expired]—
including the right to make it in precisely the shape it carried when patented—
passes to the public.’”105 Allowing false designation of origin claims for
unattributed copying of creative content would undermine copyright’s
limitations, in the Court’s view, just as allowing the trade dress claim in
TrafFix would have undermined the limitations of patent law.
Despite the Supreme Court’s discussion in Dastar and its recognition in
Wal-Mart of the role that product design plays in rendering products “more
useful or more appealing,”106 trade dress doctrine has not given the same level
of deference to either copyright or design patent law as it has to utility patent
law. The primary tool for limiting trade dress protection of aesthetic product
design features is the semantically awkward “aesthetic functionality” doctrine.
While earlier cases had treated design patents and utility patents equivalently,
during the last half of the twentieth century courts relaxed their previous
general insistence that unpatented designs be available for copying.107 Rather

101. 539 U.S. 23 (2003).
102. Id. at 26.
103. Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2011) (“Any person who, on or in

connection with any goods or services . . . uses in commerce . . . any false designation of
origin . . . , which (A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to
the . . . origin . . . of his or her goods . . . , or (B) . . . misrepresents the . . . geographic origin
of his or her or another’s persons goods . . . shall be liable . . . .”).
104. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 37.
105. Id. at 33 (alteration in original) (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 374
U.S. 225, 230 (1964)).
106. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
107. Under this old view, unfair competition law could, at most, require labeling. See
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 232-33 & n.9 (1964); Compco Corp. v.
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than working from a competitive baseline of free copying,108 courts
increasingly sought to determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether trade dress
protection of particular features would impose competitive harm in the static
market for the particular type of product. A feature would be “functional”
under this rubric only if it was a “competitive necessity” in the present market,
meaning that alternatives were unavailable.109
While TrafFix rejected this view with respect to mechanical functionality
and emphasized the functionality doctrine’s channeling function vis-à-vis
utility patent law,110 courts have more uniformly adopted the competitive
necessity approach to “aesthetic” design features (the color of a pill, the shape
of a stacking tray, etc.).111 This is the approach the Supreme Court seemed to
endorse in TrafFix by stating that “[i]t is proper to inquire into a significant
non-reputation-related disadvantage in cases of aesthetic functionality.”112 As
explained in an extensive and influential opinion by Judge Posner, for example,
an aesthetic feature would be deemed functional only if “without it other
producers of the product could not compete effectively.”113 In other words, the
aesthetic functionality doctrine considers whether trade dress protection for
particular aesthetic elements will reduce the market availability of consumers’
preferred options enough to give the trade dress owner an unfair advantage
(and, presumably, harm consumers by allowing the owner to charge monopoly
rents). Courts adopting the competitive necessity approach embrace product
differentiation, which trade dress protection promotes, so long as the alternative
Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 238 (1964); Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305
U.S. 111, 120 (1938); see also Ralph S. Brown, Design Protection: An Overview, 34 UCLA
L. Rev. 1341 (1987); Mark P. McKenna, (Dys)functionality, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 823 (2011).
108. Paul Goldstein, Copyright, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 79, 84 (1992); McKenna
supra note 107, at 836-43.
109. In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1339, 1341 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
110. Some courts have clung to the competitive need view of functionality even after
TrafFix, see Valu Eng’g, Inc. v. Rexnord Corp., 278 F.3d 1268, 1276-77 (Fed. Cir. 2002),
but most courts have now come to understand TrafFix as rejecting that view, see, e.g.,
Groeneveld Trans. Efficiency, Inc. v. Lubecore, Int’l, Inc., 730 F.3d 494, 506-07 (6th Cir.
2013) (rejecting the plaintiff’s “invitation to drift back into the error of inquiring about
possible alternative designs”); Jay Franco & Sons, Inc. v. Franek, 615 F.3d 855, 857 (7th
Cir. 2010) (“[P]atent law alone protects useful designs from mimicry; the functionality
doctrine polices the division of responsibilities between patent and trademark law by
invalidating marks on useful designs.”); Tie Tech, Inc. v. Kinedyne Corp., 296 F.3d 778, 786
(9th Cir. 2002) (“[A] product’s manufacturer ‘does not have rights under trade dress law to
compel its competitors to resort to alternative designs which have a different set of
advantages and disadvantages. Such is the realm of patent law.’” (quoting Leatherman Tool
Grp., Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 199 F.3d 1009, 1014 n.7 (9th Cir. 1999))).
111. See, e.g., Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 853 (1982)
(affirming a district court’s finding that pill colors were functional); W.T. Rogers Co., Inc. v.
Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 338-41 (7th Cir. 1985).
112. TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mkting. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 33 (2001).
113. W.T. Rogers, 778 F.2d at 346.

001--MCKENNA & STRANDBURG_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

26

STANFORD TECHNOLOGY LAW REVIEW

2/27/2014 9:55 AM

[Vol. 17:1

designs available to competitors are not so inadequate as not to be meaningful
alternatives at all.114
Is trade dress law’s disparate treatment of utilitarian and aesthetic features
consistent with the distinction we have made between patent law’s notion of
cumulative progress for utilitarian innovations and copyright law’s notion of
quantity and variety as definitive of aesthetic progress? We think not. To begin
with, we believe that the competitive necessity test often is applied incorrectly
by courts even on its own terms. In assessing competitive necessity, courts
often have concluded that aesthetic features (in general, not just those at issue
in specific cases) are not competitively necessary because competitors can
simply develop their own, different, aesthetically pleasing features (much more
easily, they imply, than they can develop mechanically functional features).
This conclusion rests on a premise that there is a vast array of similarly
attractive aesthetic features from which to choose.115 According to Professor
McCarthy, “[T]he range of possible aesthetic designs and configurations is as
infinite as are the tastes that desire them, [so] according trademark protection to
aesthetic features would not greatly hinder competition.”116
The view that protection for aesthetic or creative features imposes little
cost because of the many available alternatives also is evident in arguments
about the economic consequences of copyright protection. Some commentators
argue that copyrights impose no significant barriers to entry because
competitors can always produce their own functionally equivalent works.117

114. In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1342-43 (C.C.P.A. 1982)
(design was not functional where “the functions of appellant’s bottle can be performed
equally well by containers of innumerable designs and, thus, no one is injured in
competition”).
115. See Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 633-34 (7th Cir. 1993) (rejecting the
argument that trademark protection for product configurations are anticompetitive and
suggesting that such protection benefits consumers and encourages creative marketing).
116. 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 7:81 (4th ed. 2010) (quoting Deborah J. Krieger, Note, The Broad Sweep of Aesthetic
Functionality: A Threat to Trademark Protection of Aesthetic Product Features, 51
FORDHAM L. REV. 345, 380 (1982)); see also Kohler, 12 F.3d at 648 (Cudahy, J., dissenting)
(“The argument for distinguishing between the subjects of design and utility patents is that,
although freedom to copy functional features may be essential to competition, freedom to
copy aesthetic features is not essential.” (citing W.T. Rogers, 778 F.2d at 339 (trademark
protection for “ornamental, fanciful shapes and patterns” does not hinder competition))).
117. See, e.g., Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Product Differentiation, 79 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 212, 218-19 (2004) (arguing that the idea-expression dichotomy, which precludes
protection for the underlying ideas of a work and therefore leaves others “free to create
alternative works with the same functional characteristics as any existing work,” effectively
“dissipates authors’ monopoly power”); id. at 218 n.16 (“There are no barriers preventing
another author from putting pen to paper and attempting to create a substitute for any written
work. In other words, although copyright prohibits others form copying the specific words
penned by J.K. Rowling without her permission, it does nothing to prevent any other person
from writing stories about a school where children learn to perform magic. The inputs
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There is, according to this argument, no competitive cost to giving J.K.
Rowling exclusive rights to Harry Potter, because each of us can write our own
series of novels about a wizard boy. In this view, the idea-expression
dichotomy and the related exclusions of 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) adequately protect
the competitive market because those rules preclude copyright protection for
the really important features—the ideas and the functional aspects.
Even if progress in aesthetic expression focuses on encouraging variety and
diversity, it does not follow that consumers are equally interested in the entire
range of that diversity at any given time. Competitive necessity is a static
notion and must be evaluated in light of the range of consumer preferences in
the current market. Yet the generally dismissive view of the importance of
aesthetic or ornamental features to consumers persists even in the face of clear
evidence (not least of which is the fact that access to the feature is being
litigated) that exclusive control of those features often gives a competitive
advantage.118 As one of us has previously argued, the belief that aesthetic
features are sometimes competitively important is the premise of the design
patent system itself:
[I]f it were generally true that competitors are at no disadvantage when they
are denied access to aesthetic or ornamental features, then design patents
would have little value. That we have a design patent system, and that the
system is actually used by designers for the purpose of excluding others from
using ornamental design features, suggests that those features sometimes are
competitively significant. Indeed it seems so obviously true that ornamental
design can be competitively important that the assertion to the contrary can
only be seen as a normative claim that competitors should not be able to copy
aesthetic features masquerading as an empirical claim about the need to do
so.119

Second, the competitive necessity test is in conflict with copyright’s theory
of progress. The competitive necessity test may be analogized to copyright’s
doctrine of merger, which denies copyright protection when a particular form
of expressing idea is needed to express the idea. Copyright has other doctrines

needed to create substitutes for more complex media are generally freely available.”); see
also Goldstein, supra note 108, at 84 (arguing that because “one author’s expression will
always be substitutable for another’s” copyright will generally not create monopoly power);
Edmund W. Kitch, Elementary and Persistent Errors in the Economic Analysis of
Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1727, 1730, 1734 (2000) (arguing that “copyrights
do not prevent competitors from creating works with the same functional characteristics” and
therefore “almost all copyrights . . . are not monopolies”); Douglas A. Smith, Collective
Administration of Copyright: An Economic Analysis, 8 RES. IN L. & ECON. 137, 139 (1986)
(“The potential monopoly power for individual holders of copyright whose works must
compete with each other is in most instances not likely to be substantial.”).
118. See Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Is Pepsi Really A Substitute for Coke?
Market Definition in Antitrust and IP, 100 GEO. L.J. 2055, 2080-91 (2012) (arguing that IPbased product differentiation has this effect more often than commonly recognized).
119. McKenna, supra note 107, at 847.
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to promote creative progress, however. The scenes-à-faire and idea-expression
doctrines deny copyright protection to basic expressive components in order to
ensure that they remain broadly available to creators. Moreover, while
trademark has its own fair use doctrines, they are notoriously unclear and often
redundant of the likelihood of confusion inquiry,120 and in any event they are
much less frequently applicable to trade dress. With the possible exception of
the First Amendment-related defenses, none of trademark law’s defensive
doctrines share copyright fair use’s emphasis on transformative uses, which
courts have used to facilitate diversity in cases such as the appropriation art
cases discussed above. Several of copyright’s doctrines limiting exclusive
rights apply without reference to whether the exempted elements are
“necessary” for a creator is to compete in the current market. Thus, for
example, in W.T. Rogers, which involved a hexagonally shaped stacking tray,
Judge Posner opined that “even with the hexagon appropriated,” an “infinity of
geometrical patterns would remain open to competitors”—for example, “an
oval, a pentagon, a trapezoid, a parallelogram, an octagon, a rectangle covered
with arabesques, or machicolated, or saw-toothed.”121 While access to these
basic geometric shapes may not be a competitive necessity, they almost
certainly are among the basic aesthetic elements that copyright excludes from
its coverage. The Supreme Court’s rejection in Qualitex of the argument that
“colors are in limited supply” seems similarly problematic.122
Because trade dress doctrine does not recognize these limitations on
copyright’s coverage of aesthetic features, it can in principle be used to obtain
exclusive rights that copyright doctrine (or design patent doctrine, to which we
turn shortly) would preclude. This is not to suggest that it is never appropriate
to grant trade dress protection to the use of a particular color on a particular
good. Perhaps the use of a green-gold color on a dry cleaning pad has
insufficient originality to be the subject of copyright protection and is
insufficiently attractive to purchasers to provide a competitive edge. In such a
case, trade dress protection may be appropriate. The point is only that
grounding the doctrine of “aesthetic functionality” entirely in concerns about
static competition is inconsistent with the copyright supremacy approach taken
by the Supreme Court in Dastar.
Today’s aesthetic functionality doctrine also treats utility patents and
design patents entirely differently. Thus, while TrafFix made no explicit
reference to design patents, the Court suggested that it might be possible to
“carry the heavy burden of showing that [a feature claimed in a utility patent] is
120. See McGeveran & McKenna, supra note 67.
121. W.T. Rogers Co., Inc. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 343 (7th Cir. 1985); see also

Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods., 514 U.S. 159, 168 (1995) (rejecting an argument against
trademarking colors on the grounds that “normally alternative colors will likely be available
for similar use by others”).
122. See Qualitex, 541 U.S. at 168-69.
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not functional, for instance by showing that it is merely an ornamental,
incidental, or arbitrary aspect of the device.”123 This dismissive treatment of
“merely” ornamental features is in considerable tension with the Court’s
approach the previous year in Wal-Mart,124 in which it downplayed the need
for trade dress protection for product design on the ground that those features
could be protected by design patents. TrafFix also suggested a different test for
aesthetic features, stating that the inquiry into competitive necessity would still
be appropriate in (at least) cases of aesthetic functionality, which the Court
suggested was the issue in Qualitex regarding the “green-gold color of [a]
laundry press pad.”125 The Court seemed simply to assume, without discussion,
that aesthetic or ornamental features would not fall under Inwood’s rule that
trade dress protection is unavailable for a feature that “is essential to the use or
purpose of the article or . . . affects the cost or quality of the article.”126
Lower courts have entrenched differential treatment of design and utility
patents in other ways as well. Most significantly, while TrafFix made clear that
utility patents are strong evidence of functionality, many courts have held that
design patents covering the features at issue are evidence that the design is
“ornamental,” rather than “functional”—and hence weigh against a finding of
functionality.127 This differential treatment of the subject matter of utility and
design patents is in significant conflict with longstanding Supreme Court
precedent holding that there is a right to copy unpatented product features128
because unpatented concepts “provide the baseline of free competition upon
which the patent system’s incentive to creative effort depends.”129 As Judge
Cudahy of the Seventh Circuit argued in his well-known dissent in Kohler, that
precedent made no distinction between utility and design patents.130 Moreover,

123. TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 30 (2001) (emphasis

added).
124. 529 U.S. 205 (2000).
125. Id. at 33 (construing Qualitex, 541 U.S. at 170). The Court’s characterization of

Qualitex has been criticized heavily by some commentators, who insist that Qualitex was not
about aesthetic functionality. See, e.g., Christopher C. Larkin, Qualitex Revisited, 94
TRADEMARK REP. 1017, 1032 (2004).
126. Id. (quoting Inwood Labs, Inc. v. Ives Labs, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10 (1982)).
127. See, e.g., In re Becton-Dickson, 675 F.3d 1368, 1380 (2012) (applying In re
Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1342 n.3 (C.C.P.A. 1982)).
128. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 156 (1989);
Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237-38 (1964); Sears, Roebuck &
Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231-32 (1964); Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S.
111, 116-17 (1938); Singer Manufacturing Co. v. June Manufacturing Co., 163 U.S. 169,
185 (1896).
129. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 156; see also McKenna, supra note 107, at 840-43.
130. Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 648 (7th Cir. 1993) (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
See Katherine J. Strandburg, Rounding the Corner on Trade Dress: A Tribute to the
Jurisprudence of Judge Richard D. Cudahy, 29 YALE J. ON REG. 387 (2012) for a detailed
exploration of this dissent and its context.
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the Supreme Court’s opinion in Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats,
Inc.,131 on which it relied in TrafFix, explicitly equated the social bargains
involved in utility and design patenting, noting with respect to both that “[t]he
attractiveness of [the patent] bargain, and its effectiveness in inducing creative
effort and disclosure of the results of that effort, depend almost entirely on a
backdrop of free competition in the exploitation of unpatented designs and
innovations.”132
This equation of design and utility patents was no accident, as (though it
often goes unnoticed) the Supreme Court made many of its most well-known
pronouncements about the importance of copying and competition in cases that
involved design patents.133 Day-Brite, for example, had received a design
patent on the lighting fixture at issue in Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting,
Inc., and it alleged design patent infringement along with unfair competition.134
The design patent claim was no longer at issue at the Supreme Court level only
because the Seventh Circuit had affirmed the district court’s finding that the
design patent was invalid because the design was functional.135 Sears and
Compco, like a number of cases before them, were quite clear that the only role
for unfair competition law was to require labeling in order to avoid passing
off.136 This understanding was based on the normative judgment that copying
was generally legitimate if the copied design did not surmount the obviousness
bar to design patenting or meet copyright’s separability requirement. Current
aesthetic functionality doctrine, however, places no weight on maintaining the
continued availability of unpatented design elements to promote design
innovation.
Whether this disparate treatment of design and utility patents is justified
depends on how well design patent law is calibrated to achieve its purposes.
Unfortunately, as we discuss in the next Section, design patent law lacks
coherent conceptual underpinnings, which not only makes design patent
doctrine problematic on its own terms, but it makes it impossible to determine
the proper relationship between design patent and copyright and trademark
protection.

131. 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
132. Id. at 151.
133. See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Compco Corp.

v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964), rev’g 311 F.2d 26 (7th Cir. 1963).
134. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Compco Corp., 311 F.2d 26, 27 (7th Cir. 1963).
135. See id. at 28 (“The District Court’s decision that the design of the cross ribs was
functional and dictated by the limitations of the manufacturing process is fully supported by
the evidence.”).
136. See McKenna, supra note 107, at 836-43.

001--MCKENNA & STRANDBURG_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

Fall 2013]

III.

2/27/2014 9:55 AM

PROGRESS AND COMPETITION IN DESIGN

31

THE INHERENT CONTRADICTIONS OF THE DESIGN PATENT SYSTEM

Despite its traditionally low profile, the design patent system is actually
quite old. So are its problems. Throughout its history the design patent system
has cycled between very low patentability thresholds, resulting in back-door
intrusions into the purview of the utility patent system, and ineffective attempts
to solve that problem by imposing more utility patent-like requirements for
design patent protection. We argue that the root cause of the design patent
system’s problems is the fact that it has conceived of its subject matter in
separationist terms, neglecting the intertwining of form and function that is the
very hallmark of modern industrial design. The current system’s failed attempt
to combine a patent-based nonobviousness inquiry with a standard of
evaluation based entirely on aesthetics reflects this problem.
Design patents were created to fill a perceived vacuum of protection. At
the time Congress passed the first design patent statute in 1842, the design of
articles of manufacture was excluded from copyright’s coverage, as well as
from patent and trademark (or unfair competition) protection. Many of those
involved in lobbying for the 1842 design patent statute were concerned
primarily with surface ornamentation,137 but the statute did not limit protection
to such “ornamental” designs. Instead, the statute’s coverage reflected its gapfilling purpose. It covered “new and original” works created by the inventor’s
“industry, genius, efforts, and expense” in a hodgepodge of categories
otherwise unprotected by IP at the time: designs for “manufactures,” fabric
designs, statues and other three-dimensional artwork, surface ornamentation of
various sorts, and product “shape or configuration.”138 The statutory language
does not seem to have been premised on any coherent foundation connecting
the patentability standard to a theoretical conception of progress in industrial
design. This is not especially surprising, given that copyright and patent
doctrine were only beginning to develop into their present, distinct forms at the
time. By the early twentieth century, however, the copyright and patent systems
had largely settled into their current forms, tailored to different conceptions of

137. See Jason J. Du Mont & Mark D. Janis, The Origins of the American Design
Patent System, 88 IND. L.J. 837, 851-52 (2013).
138. The original statute offered design patents to those who through their own
industry, genius, efforts, and expense, may have invented or produced any new and original
[1] design for a manufacture, whether of metal or other material or materials, or any new and
original [2] design for the printing of woolen, silk, cotton, or other fabrics, or any new and
original [3] design for a bust, statue, or bas relief or composition in alto or basso relievo, or
any new and original [4] impression or ornament, or to be placed on any article of
manufacture, the same being formed in marble or other material, or any new and useful [5]
pattern, or print, or picture, to be either worked into or worked on, or printed or painted or
cast or otherwise fixed on, any article of manufacture, or any new and original [6] shape or
configuration of any article of manufacture not known or used by others.” Design Patent Act
of 1842, ch. 263, § 3, 5 Stat. 543, 544.
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progress for aesthetic expression and utilitarian technology. Unfortunately,
design patent doctrine retains features of both systems without any coherent
guiding principle.
A. The Patent and Copyright Context at the Birth of the Design Patent
System
In 1842, the domains of copyright and patent law were much less clearly
delineated than they are today, both individually and with respect to one
another. For example, the terms of copyright and patent were more comparable,
with copyright’s term being 28 years with a possibility of a 14-year renewal139
and patent’s term 14 years with a possible 7-year extension.140 Most
importantly, the basic thresholds for copyright and patent protection were much
more similar (and less well-established) at the time. Courts had not yet
developed patent law’s nonobviousness requirement, and the patent statute
required only that a patented invention be “new” and “useful.”141 According to
Curtis’s well-known 1849 patent treatise, while “mere colorable variations, or
slight and unimportant changes” would not suffice, a patent would be awarded
as long as the invention “ha[d] not substantially existed before.”142 To show
that an invention was “substantially” new, it was enough to show that it was
“better, more useful, or cheaper than the old.”143 Thus, at the time the design
patent statute was enacted, the patentability standard appears to have required
only rather minimal advances and, most importantly, paid no attention to
whether the invention went beyond what the market would have produced in
the ordinary course. In 1850, in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, the Court raised the
patentability bar and established the standard on which the present-day
nonobviousness requirement is based: “unless more ingenuity and skill . . .
were required . . . than were possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted
with the business, there was an absence of that degree of skill and ingenuity
which constitute essential elements of every invention.”144 By demanding an
inventive step beyond what would be produced by the “ordinary mechanic,”
this standard recognizes the cumulative nature of technological progress.
139. Copyright Act of 1831, ch. 16, § 2, 4 Stat. 436, 436-37.
140. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, §§ 6, 18, 5 Stat. 117, 119, 124-25.
141. Id. § 6 (making patents available to “any person or persons having discovered or

invented any new and useful art . . . not known or used by others before his or their
discovery or invention thereof”).
142. GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL
INVENTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 6 (1st ed. 1849) (emphasis added), available
at http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uc2.ark:/13960/t2w37v337;view=1up;seq=54.
143. Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248, 255 (1850) (quoting CURTIS,
supra note 142, at 7 n.3) (internal quotation mark omitted) (construing the plaintiff’s
argument).
144. Id. at 267.
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The original subject matter of copyright—books, maps, and charts—
consisted of works from which users could learn and advance “science,”145
making them amenable to a conception of “progress” not so different from
technological progress. In 1842, copyright was not far removed from this
original conception, “historical or other print[s]” having been added to the list
in 1802,146 and musical compositions and “prints or engravings” added only in
1831.147 Not until 1870 was the statute amended to cover “painting, drawing,
chromo, statue, statuary, and . . . models or designs intended to be perfected as
works of the fine arts.”148
Two opinions by Justice Story, in 1839149 and 1845150 respectively,
considered the copyrightability of textbooks that combined excerpts from
previous works. Story held that such combinations were potentially
copyrightable because of the “labor[] and intellectual exertion” involved in
“[t]he plan, the arrangement, and the combination” of the excerpts.151 Unlike in
the patent law at the time, there was no consideration of whether the new
arrangements were “better or worse” than prior arrangements. Improvement
was “not a material inquiry in this case,”152 but something that would sort itself
out in the market: “If worse, his work will not be used by the community at
large; if better, it is very likely to be so used.”153
Despite this difference, the patent and copyright standards imposed
similarly low thresholds for protection during this pre-Hotchkiss period.
Interestingly, Story justified the minimal standard for copyrightability by a
concept of cumulative progress, noting that “[e]very book in literature, science

145. According to Barton Beebe, “science” was “generally understood [at the founding]
to refer to systematic theoretical and empirical knowledge (i.e., Wissenschaft)” as opposed to
“useful arts” which referred to “technology or commercial practices.” See Beebe, supra note
34, at 3-4. Moreover, “[w]hile ‘science’ sometimes covered the ‘general principles’ of the
fine as well as the useful arts, it was nevertheless understood to be fundamentally distinct
from these applied arts, particularly when the term ‘science’ was used in conjunction with
‘arts.’” Id. at 4 (footnotes omitted).
146. Copyright Act of 1802, ch. 36, § 2, 2 Stat. 171, 171.
147. Copyright Act of 1831, ch. 16, § 1, 4 Stat. 436, 436. (“[T]he author or authors of
any book or books, map, chart, or musical composition, which may be now made or
composed, and not printed and published, or shall hereafter be made or composed, or who
shall invent, design, etch, engrave, work, or cause to be engraved, etched, or worked from
his own design, any print or engraving, and the executors, administrators, or legal assigns of
such person or persons, shall have the sole right and liberty of printing, reprinting,
publishing, and vending such book or books, map, chart, musical composition, print, cut, or
engraving . . . .”).
148. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 198, 212.
149. Gray v. Russell, 10 F. Cas. 1035 (C.C.D. Mass. 1839) (No. 5,728).
150. Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4,436).
151. Gray, 10 F. Cas. at 1037.
152. Emerson, 8 F. Cas. at 621.
153. Id.
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and art, borrows, and must necessarily borrow, and use much which was well
known and used before.”154 He compared the textbooks at issue to other works
of a scholarly nature: from commentaries and treatises, which “for the most
part, consist of selections from the works and criticisms of various former
authors, arranged in a new form”;155 to eminent works of “antiquity,” whose
authors “gathered much from the abundant stores of current knowledge and
classical studies in their days”; and to maps, which are copyrightable despite
the fact that all maps must “the more accurate they are, approach nearer in
design and execution to each other.”156 For reasons that are unclear (but
perhaps had to do with copyright’s limited scope at that time), he did not
concern himself with the effects of a low originality standard on the availability
of excerpts to be combined by these later authors.
While generous to subject matter such as maps, charts, and “serious”
books, copyright doctrine in the first half of the nineteenth century was much
less hospitable to works of a commercial nature. In 1829, for example, a court
denied copyright to a financial newspaper because “[copyright] is for the
encouragement of learning and was not intended for the encouragement of
mere industry, unconnected with learning and the sciences.”157 Copyright’s
connection to aesthetic expression was made only much later. While the
inclusion of works of “fine art” in the 1870 statute broke the connection
between copyright and “learning and the sciences,” copyright continued to
emphasize intellectual pursuits. In 1884, the Supreme Court upheld the
copyrightability of photographs of Oscar Wilde against an argument that they
were merely copied mechanistically from nature.158 The Court’s reasoning
rested squarely on the photographers “intellectual invention” in “posing” the
subject, “selecting and arranging the costume, draperies, and other various
accessories,” “arranging the subject so as to present graceful outlines,” and so
forth.159 The Court therefore left undecided the question of whether copyright
was available for the more “mechanical reproduction” involved in the “ordinary
production of a photograph.”160 Only in 1903 did the Court sweep away those
distinctions entirely.
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co. involved the copyrightability of
circus posters depicting acts such as “an ordinary ballet,” “the Stirk family,
performing on bicycles” and “men and women whitened to represent
statues.”161 The Court refused to distinguish between these advertisements and
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id. at 619.
Gray, 10 F. Cas. at 1038.
Emerson, 8 F. Cas. at 619.
Clayton v. Stone, 5 F. Cas. 999, 1003 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1829) (No. 2,872).
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 60 (1884).
Id.
Id. at 59.
188 U.S. 239, 248 (1903).
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copyrightable “fine arts”:
Certainly works are not the less connected with the fine arts because their
pictorial quality attracts the crowd and therefore gives them a real use—if use
means to increase trade and to help to make money. A picture is none the less
a picture and none the less a subject of copyright that it is used for an
advertisement. And if pictures may be used to advertise soap, or the theatre, or
monthly magazines, as they are, they may be used to advertise a circus. 162

Thus, over time, partly through statutory amendment and partly through
judicial interpretation, copyright protection was extended from its original
focus on “science” to encompass first “fine arts” and then virtually any form of
expression. During this expansion, the minimal originality requirement was
maintained.163 Importantly, however, the justification for the minimal standard
shifted. Justice Story had justified his minimal originality standard on the
ground that all scholarly works built upon previous work. Bleistein’s rationale
was founded instead on the mystery of artistic expression and its deeply
personal nature: “The copy [made when drawing from nature] is the personal
reaction of an individual upon nature. Personality always contains something
unique. It expresses its singularity even in handwriting, and a very modest
grade of art has in it something irreducible, which is one man’s alone.”164
While Story insisted that it was “immaterial” to his decision whether the
textbook at issue was better or worse than others, he was comfortable giving his
own view that “the plaintiff’s method [was] a real and substantial improvement
upon all the works which had preceded his.”165 He assumed that a work’s
quality would be revealed by its success in the market. The Bleistein court, on
the other hand, embraced a low copyrightability threshold because it considered
courts unqualified to assess the artistic merit of a work of art. Moreover, the
Court had equally little confidence in the market’s ability to do so, given that
works of genius may be “repulsive until the public ha[s] learned the new
language in which their author spoke.”166 Both the emphasis on personal
expression and the concern with the unpredictability of artistic merit lead away
from a patent-like conception of cumulative progress and toward the
conception reflected in copyright doctrine today.
In the 1840s, however, when the design patent system was first created,
neither copyright nor patent doctrine was well developed. Both systems had
relatively minimal standards for obtaining protection, while both also had at
least somewhat cumulative conceptions of progress. The inherent contradiction
162. Id. at 251.
163. This requirement was given slightly more teeth, however, when Feist Publications,

Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340 (1991), undermined the “sweat of the
brow” justification for copyright.
164. Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 300.
165. Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 621 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4,436).
166. Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 251.
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between minimal thresholds for protection and cumulative conceptions of
progress thus infected both patent and copyright at that time. By the early
twentieth century, they had evolved the very distinct but more or less internally
consistent approaches discussed in Part I. But design patent law never
benefitted from this evolution.
B. The Design Patent Treadmill
1. Design patents pre-1952
The 1842 design patent statute covered (among other things) “any new and
original shape or configuration of any article of manufacture not known or used
by others,”167 echoing the patentability standard of the time. It also required
applicants to affirm that their designs had resulted from “their own industry,
genius, efforts, and expense,”168 a standard which echoed the emphasis on
investment of labor in some contemporaneous copyright decisions.169 Little is
known about how the patent office interpreted the statutory requirements
during the design patent system’s first few years.170 Few patents were issued
and there were no reported cases dealing with patentability standards.171
The first recorded judicial interpretation of the design patentability
standard was in 1865, following a revision of the statute in 1861,172 which left
the patentability standard intact. In Wooster v. Crane,173 the court invalidated a
design patent on a rhombus-shaped reel for storing dress trimmings. Though
the court referred to design patent’s requirement of “industry, genius, efforts
and expense,” the opinion did not really inquire into the difficulty of the
inventive process. Instead, the court based its conclusion on the fact that the
design was no better than previous designs. The court observed that “the shape
[was] a common one in many articles of manufacture” and that “[n]o advantage
whatever is pretended to be derived from the adoption of the form selected by
the plaintiff.”174 The emphasis on lack of “advantage” is reminiscent of the preHotchkiss utility patent requirement that an invention be “better, more useful,
or cheaper than the old.”175 Moreover, the choice of a rhombus “was simply an
167. Design Patent Act of 1842, ch. 263, § 3, 5 Stat. 543, 544.
168. Id.
169. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26, 60-61 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869) (No. 8,136)

(citing Kelly v. Morris, L.R. 1 Eq. 697 (1866)).
170. Jason J. Du Mont, A Non-Obvious Design: Reexamining the Origins of the Design
Patent Standard, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 531, 545 (2010).
171. Id.
172. Design Patent Act of 1861, ch. 88, 12 Stat. 246.
173. Wooster v. Crane, 30 F. Cas. 612 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1865) (No. 18,036).
174. Id. at 612
175. Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248, 255 (1850) (quoting CURTIS,
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arbitrary, chance selection of many well known shapes, all equally well
adapted to the purpose.”176 Thus, this first case appears to have found the
design patent invalid, at least in part, because there was no necessary
relationship between form and function.
The 1869 patent commissioner opinion in Ex parte Crane177 marked the
beginning of design patent law’s intrusion into the terrain of utility patents. In
that case, the same Mr. Crane had applied for a design patent on a box for
holding furs after his application for a utility patent was rejected under the
Hotchkiss standard.178 The design patent application initially was rejected by
the examiner, a decision upheld by the appellate board, because the design was
not “for ornament merely.”179 Had this decision stood, it would essentially
have imposed a strict separability requirement, limiting design patents to
features without any function whatsoever. The Patent Commissioner
overturned the rejection, however, noting that the “line of distinction between
what is useful and what is merely ornamental is, in some cases, very
indefinite,” and that “designs for utility,” no less than purely ornamental
designs, “add to the market value and salability” of manufactured articles.180
Later that same year, in Ex parte Bartholomew,181 a different
Commissioner went even further, stating that “no element of the artistic or
ornamental” was required for design patentability.182 The Commissioner in
Bartholomew also stated explicitly that the design patent standard was much
lower than the standard for utility patents: “From the nature of the subjectmatter, there must always be more latitude in the issue of patents for trifling
changes of form or outline, since it is only necessary that such changes should
constitute a new design to entitle them to a patent of this class.”183
Congress passed a number of intellectual property reforms in 1870 as part
of a post-Civil War overhaul of federal legislation. The Act of 1870 included
the first federal trademark provisions184 and extended copyright protection to
“any . . . painting, drawing, chromo, statue, statuary, [or] models or designs
supra note 142, at 7 n.3) (internal quotation mark omitted) (construing the plaintiff’s
argument).
176. Wooster, 30 F. Cas. at 612 (emphasis added).
177. 1869 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 7.
178. Id. at 7.
179. Id. at 8.
180. Id. at 7.
181. 1869 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 103.
182. Id. at 105.
183. Id.
184. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, §§ 77-84, 16 Stat. 198, 210-12. The trademark
portions of the Act were struck down in The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 99 (1879)
(invalidating the trademark legislation of 1870 and the Act of Aug. 14, 1876, ch. 274,
19 Stat. 141, which imposed criminal sanctions against those who fraudulently used, sold, or
counterfeited trademarks).
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intended to be perfected as works of the fine arts.”185 Perhaps in an effort to
distinguish the subject matter of design patents from the newly copyrightable
subject matter, the reforms also redefined the categories of design patent
protection to require that a patentable “shape or configuration of any article of
manufacture” be not only “new” and “original,” but also “useful.”186 The 1870
reforms thus solidified design patents’ intrusion into utility patent territory,
while leaving the minimal design patentability standard in place. Under this
standard, one could obtain design patents on minimally original designs, even if
those designs were primarily utilitarian in nature, thereby evading the more
demanding requirements of utility patentability.
Shortly after the enactment of the 1870 Act, a new patent commissioner
sought to deal with this problem by simultaneously importing a Hotchkiss-like
standard and refocusing the design patent inquiry on aesthetic, rather than
utilitarian, creativity.187 Though courts initially resisted importation of the
Hotchkiss approach into design patent doctrine,188 in Smith v. Whitman Saddle,
the Supreme Court explicitly affirmed that, in order to be patentable, a design
must result from “[t]he exercise of the inventive or originative faculty.”189 To
further clarify that design patents were not substitutes for utility patents,
Congress in 1902 amended the design patent statute, removing the word
“useful,” and replacing it with the word “ornamental.”190 As a result, under the
new statute, design patents were available to “[a]ny person who [had] invented
any new, original, and ornamental design for an article of manufacture.”191
Unfortunately, while either of these two steps might have improved things
if made independently, in combination they led right back into the quagmire.
Having melded the Hotchkiss standard from utility patent law with subject
matter defined by ornamentality, courts were left with the task of assessing the
size of the step forward reflected in a particular aesthetic expression, a task that
copyright had found impossible. Specifically, courts were required to determine
whether a design reflected some inventive step beyond what came before, but
there was no conceptual basis on which they could make such a judgment.
C. The Conceptual Incoherence of the Modern Design Patent Regime
Design patent law’s conceptual incoherence was solidified when the 1952
Patent Act purported to apply identical novelty and nonobviousness

185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

§ 86, 16 Stat. at 212.
§ 71, 16 Stat. at 209-10.
See Dumont, supra note 170, at 568-69.
Id. at 550-51.
148 U.S. 674, 679 (1893).
Act of May 9, 1902, ch. 783, 32 Stat. 193, 193.
Id.
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requirements to utility and design patents. The trouble, of course, is that the
nonobviousness requirement is rooted in a cumulative conception of progress.
It demands that patents be awarded only when required to incentivize advances
that go beyond the dynamic competitive baseline. Unfortunately, as copyright
doctrine recognizes, there is no workable standard for measuring the “size” of
an aesthetic advance. As a result, application of the nonobviousness
requirement to utility and design patents is identical in name only. The Federal
Circuit has coped with this inherent contradiction by adopting a very relaxed
nonobviousness standard for design patents.192
To find a design obvious, a court must begin by identifying a single
“primary reference,” the “design characteristics of which are basically the same
as the claimed design.”193 If and only if the court can identify such a primary
reference, then other references may be used to modify it if the references are
“so related [to the primary reference] that the appearance of certain ornamental
features in one would suggest the application of those features to the other.”194
Not surprisingly, this stringent test leads to few invalidations or rejections. To
take one recent example, the Federal Circuit in High Point Design LLC v.
Buyers Direct, Inc.,195 reversed the district court’s summary judgment finding
of obviousness regarding the following design, which the court characterized as
disclosing “slippers with an opening for a foot that contain a fuzzy (fleece)
lining and have a smooth outer surface”:196

Slipper design at issue in High Point Design197

The district court had identified two models of slippers sold by Woolrich as
primary references—the “Penta” and the “Laurel Hill”:

192. See Janice M. Mueller & Daniel Harris Brean, Overcoming the “Impossible Issue”
of Nonobviousness in Design Patents, 99 KY. L.J. 419, 425 (2011).
193. Durling v. Spectrum Furniture Co., Inc., 101 F.3d 100, 103 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(internal quotation mark omitted).
194. Id. (quoting In re Borden, 90 F.3d 1570, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1996)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
195. 730 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
196. Id. at 1307.
197. U.S. Patent No. D598,183 figs.1, 4, 7 & 9 (filed Jan. 22, 2009).
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“Penta” slipper (left); “Laurel Hill” slipper (right)198

According to the district court, the Penta “look[ed] indistinguishable from
the drawing shown in the ‘183 Patent,” and the Laurel Hill, “while having
certain differences with the Penta slipper that [were] insubstantial and might be
referred to as streamlining, nonetheless ha[d] the precise look that an ordinary
observer would think of as a physical embodiment of the drawings shown on
the ‘183 Patent.”199
The district court then identified the following two designs, disclosed in
prior design patents, as secondary references, particularly focusing on their
disclosure of small dots on the bottom surface:

Secondary References200

Combining these references, the district court found the design claimed in
the ‘183 Patent obvious.201 The Federal Circuit reversed, faulting the district

198.
199.
200.
201.

High Point Design, 730 F.3d at 1307-08.
Id. at 1309.
Id. at 1309-10.
Id. at 1310. The district court wrote:
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court for assessing obviousness from the viewpoint of an “ordinary observer”
rather than an ordinary designer.202 The district court also erred, according to
the Federal Circuit, because it failed to “translate the design of the ‘183 Patent
into a verbal description”203—or perhaps more accurately, for describing the
design at “too high a level of abstraction” and “failing to focus ‘on the
distinctive visual appearances of the reference and the claimed design.’”204
And the Federal Circuit claimed that the district court failed to provide
sufficient reasoning for its determination that the Penta and/or the Laurel Hill
served as a primary reference that created “basically the same visual
impression.”205 The district court was supposed to put the claimed design sideby-side with the potential primary reference and determine whether the
reference had basically the same design. It was apparently supposed to do this
from the perspective of an ordinary designer, though it remains unclear whether
that standard applied to each step or only to the overall determination of
obviousness. And to the Federal Circuit, there was some doubt about whether
the references were close enough.
This approach is striking in its failure to apply recent Supreme Court
precedent interpreting the statutory nonobviousness requirement, which is
common to utility and design patents. In 2007, the Supreme Court determined
that the Federal Circuit had adopted an overly permissive nonobviousness test
for utility patents. The rejected test had deemed an invention invalid for
obviousness only if there was a “teaching, suggestion, or motivation to

The overall visual effect created by the Woolrich prior art is the same overall visual effect
created by the ‘183 patent. To an ordinary observer, they are the same slippers. The only
difference between the slippers relates to the sole of the slippers, which is quite minor in the
context of the overall slipper. Even if, however, this Court were to find that the differences in
the sole design were of any note, the design of the dots on the ‘183 patent are anticipated by
the dots on the [Secondary References].
Since both of those design patents were noted on the face of the ‘183 patent, and since
both relate to slippers, they would have been available to a slipper designer skilled in the
art—and would have easily suggested the addition of “dots” to the sole of a slipper.
Combining the dots shown on those two design patents with the prior art in the Woolrich
slipper would have been obvious to any designer. That combination would have created a
slipper with a virtually identical visual impression as [the] ‘183 patent.

Id. (alterations in original).
202. Id. at 1313-15.
203. Id. at 1314. This criticism is in significant tension with Egyptian Goddess, which
discouraged courts from rendering any verbal claim construction in the design patent
context. Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 679 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc)
(“Given the recognized difficulties entailed in trying to describe a design in words, the
preferable course ordinarily will be for a district court not to attempt to ‘construe’ a design
patent claim by providing a detailed verbal description of the claimed design.”). For a
persuasive critique of translating images to verbal descriptions, see Rebecca Tushnet, The
Eye Alone Is the Judge: Images and Design Patents, 19 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 409 (2012).
204. High Point Design, 730 F.3d at 1314 (quoting Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co.,
678 F.3d 1314, 1331-32 (2012)).
205. Id.
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combine” pertinent prior art references.206 In rejecting the test, the Court noted
that “it often may be the case that market demand, rather than scientific
literature, will drive design trends,” and that “[a] person of ordinary skill is also
a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.”207
Despite the purported applicability of the same statutory provision to
design patents, it seems clear that the Federal Circuit’s standards for
nonobviousness in design patent law are relatively low, as compared to utility
patent standards. First, and most obviously, utility patent law has nothing
analogous to the “primary reference” step the Federal Circuit requires in design
patent law. Indeed, by requiring a single reference that is so close to the
claimed design, the Federal Circuit’s approach comes dangerously close to
collapsing obviousness and novelty altogether. Making matters worse, the
Federal Circuit’s standard for deeming a prior art reference sufficiently similar
to serve as a primary reference is quite high. The Federal Circuit’s conclusion
in High Point that the primary references identified by the district court may
not have been sufficiently similar attests to the stringency of this standard.
Likewise, in Apple, Inc. v Samsung Elecs. Co.,208 the Federal Circuit held
that the 1994 Fidler device was not sufficiently similar to the claimed design to
count as a primary reference.209 Looking at the two designs side-by-side, the
Federal Circuit saw substantial differences: the Fidler tablet is not symmetrical;
the frame of the Fidler tablet differs from the “unframed” Apple design; the
Fidler tablet contains no thin bezel surrounding edge of the front side; one
corner of the frame in the Fidler contains multiple perforations; and the sides of
the Fidler reference are neither smooth nor symmetrical.210

Claimed design (left); Fidler design (right)211

206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2006).
Id. at 418, 421.
678 F.3d. 1314 (2012).
Id. at 1331.
Id. at 1330-31.
Id. at 1330.
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Moreover, even assuming that the Fidler tablet qualified as a primary
reference, the Federal Circuit did not think the other reference (the HewlettPackard Compaq Tablet TC1000) bridged the gap between the Fidler and the
Apple design:
First, while the TC1000 has a flat glass front, the screen area of that device is
surrounded by a gray area that frames the screen. In addition, the perimeter of
the TC1000 is encircled by a wide rounded-over metallic rim. And the screen
area contains indicator lights in several places, unlike the minimalist design
claimed in the D ‘889 patent.212

Hewlett-Packard Compaq Tablet TC1000213

Collectively, these differences were enough that the court did not believe
the two references could be combined. In a statement highly reminiscent of the
old “teaching, suggestion, and motivation” test, the Federal Circuit noted that
“[t]he teachings of prior art designs may be combined only when the designs
are ‘so related that the appearance of certain ornamental features in one
[design] would suggest the application of those features to the other.’”214
This practical evisceration of the nonobviousness requirement likely has
been driven in part by courts’ understandable difficulty in measuring
“progress” in aesthetic aspects of design, which is what the current
interpretation of nonobviousness for designs requires. Such a minimal standard
is more consistent with copyright doctrine, and perhaps it would be justified for
design patents if they were limited to ornamentation or purely aesthetic aspects
of design. The Federal Circuit, however, also has declined to enforce any

212. Id. at 1331.
213. Id. at 1329.
214. Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting In re Borden, 90 F.3d 1570, 1575

(1996)).
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meaningful limitation of design patent coverage to ornamental or aesthetic
elements. While copyright protects only those aesthetic features that are
“conceptually separable” from functional aspects of a useful article,215 design
patent law disqualifies a claimed design only when the design, as a whole, is
“dictated by” functional considerations.216 To determine whether a claimed
design is functional under this standard, a court may consider:
[1] whether the protected design represents the best design; [2] whether
alternative designs would adversely affect the utility of the specified article;
[3] whether there are any concomitant utility patents; [4] whether the
advertising touts particular features of the design as having specific utility; [5]
and whether there are any elements in the design or an overall appearance
clearly not dictated by function.217

Not surprisingly, courts have only very rarely found a claimed design
“dictated by function.”218 Design patent doctrine once again has failed to
rescue the system from the problems that plagued it in 1869—design patents
undermine utility patent doctrines that protect cumulative technological
progress by providing “back door” protection for utilitarian features under a
low patentability standard.
IV.

INTEGRATION OF FORM AND FUNCTION: A SENSIBLE DESIGN PATENT GOAL?

Design patent’s position at the intersection between patent, copyright, and
trademark looks more and more like a seat between a rock and a hard place.
The design patent system is no longer needed as a gap-filler. Unlike the
copyright law in effect in 1842, present-day copyright covers ornamentation of
useful three-dimensional objects, separating ornamentation from functional

215. See, e.g., Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir.
N.Y. 1987); see also supra notes 82-89 and accompanying text.
216. See, e.g., PHG Techs., LLC v. St. John Cos., 469 F.3d 1361, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(“The design of a useful article is deemed to be functional when ‘the appearance of the
claimed design is ‘dictated by’ the use or purpose of the article.’” (quoting L.A. Gear, Inc. v.
Thom McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 1123 (Fed. Cir. 1993))).
217. High Point Design LLC v. Buyers Direct, Inc., 730 F.3d 1301, 1315-16 (Fed. Cir.
2013) (alterations in original) (quoting PHG Techs., 469 F.3d at 1366). These factors are
highly reminiscent of the Federal Circuit’s Morton-Norwich factors, which it uses to asses
functionality in the trade dress context. See In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d
1332, 1340-41 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (factors are (1) “the existence of an expired utility patent”;
(2) whether the designer “touts the utilitarian advantages through advertising”; (3) the
availability of alternative designs; and (4) whether the design results from a “simple or cheap
method” of manufacture). Notably, those factors were inspired by the competitive necessity
view of functionality the Supreme Court downplayed in TrafFix. See supra notes 109-110
and accompanying text.
218. But see Best Lock Corp. v. Ilco Unican Corp., 94 F.3d 1563, 1566-57 (Fed Cir.
1996) (key blade design claimed in design patent was dictated solely by key blade’s function
and thus invalid).
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aspects with its useful article doctrine.219 In Mazer, the Supreme Court missed
an opportunity to address the relationship between copyright and design
patents. There, the defendant had argued that copyright protection for the lamp
bases should be precluded if it would interfere with the design patent system,
which “require[s] the critical examination given patents to protect the public
against monopoly.”220 The Court simply failed to engage this issue in any
meaningful way, merely stating that “[t]he dichotomy of protection for the
aesthetic is not beauty and utility but art for the copyright and the invention of
original and ornamental design for design patents.”221 What this statement
leaves entirely unanswered, of course, is the question that hangs over design
patent doctrine to this day: What is “invention” in the context of design? If it is
located neither in copyrightable “art” nor in patentable utility, where is it to be
found?
In response to the tension between the nonobviousness doctrine’s
cumulative conception of progress and the current design patent system’s sole
focus on the aesthetic and “ornamental” aspects of design, several
commentators have suggested that the nonobviousness requirement should be
abolished or significantly weakened.222 However, design patent law’s coverage
of articles that combine ornamental and functional aspects (as long as design,
as a whole, is not “dictated by function”) means that a weak design patent
nonobviousness standard may undermine utility patent law’s balancing
approach to cumulative technological progress. One solution to this problem
would be to strengthen design patent law’s functionality requirement, so as to
more clearly differentiate design patent law’s subject matter from that of utility
patent law. But while we think there are good reasons to prevent design patent
law from protecting useful features, it is not clear what a design patent system
limited specifically to aesthetic expression would add to the current copyright
system.223
We suggest that we can get off the design patent treadmill only if we can

219. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2011) (“[T]he design of a useful article, as defined in this
section, shall be considered a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only if, and only to the
extent that, such design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be
identified separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian
aspects of the article.”).
220. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 215 (1954).
221. Id. at 217-18.
222. See, e.g., Du Mont, supra note 170, at 535 (“Applying a historical lens, this Article
establishes yet another basis for policy makers to free design patents from the unworkable
and inappropriate nonobviousness requirement.”).
223. This is not to say that there is anything inevitable about copyright’s current scope.
It may well be more sensible, overall, to exclude design of articles of manufacture from
copyright and use some other system exclusively for design. We take no position on that
question here. We do, however, have real concerns about whether any such other system
should be a patent system.
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reorient the design patent system to a cumulative conception of progress that is
appropriate to design. To do so, we will need to solve two related problems.
First, we need some meaningful, even if approximate, metric by which to
measure aesthetic progress. Without such a metric, we cannot balance the needs
of current and follow-on inventors of industrial designs. Nor can we assess the
costs of overlapping trade dress or copyright protection. Second, we need to
find a way to consider design as an integration of aesthetic and utilitarian
aspects of product configuration. Prior attempts to prevent use of the design
patent system as a backdoor form of protection for useful product features,
from the early attempts to impose separability to the modern ornamentality
requirement, have foundered. The attempt to make a sharp distinction between
the useful features of industrial designs, on the one hand, and their ornamental
or aesthetic features, on the other, is doomed to failure because overall designs
(as distinct from surface ornamentation) nearly always are, to a greater or lesser
extent, both useful and aesthetic.
Compare, for example, the design of athletic shoes at issue in L.A. Gear,
Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co.,224 the cup-to-go design in Berry Sterling Corp. v.
Pescor Plastics, Inc.,225 and Richardson’s design of the “stepclaw” at issue in
Richardson v. Stanley Works, Inc.,226 depicted below from left to right:227

Each of these designs has features that are functional in the sense that they
contribute to the utilitarian performance of the articles. With respect to the shoe
design, the “delta wing” provides support for the foot and reinforces the
shoelace eyelets; the cup’s lower portion allows it to fit into most car cup
holders; and the jaw of the “stepclaw” has to be opposite the hammer head so
that the tool can be used as a step.228 But at the same time, this particular delta
wing seems clearly to have aesthetic value, and there are many other ways to
224.
225.
226.
227.

988 F.2d 1117 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
122 F.3d 1452 (Fed Cir. 1997).
597 F.3d 1288 (Fed Cir. 2010).
L.A. Gear, 988 F.2d at 1121 (left); Richardson, 597 F.3d at 1455 fig.3 (center);
Berry Sterling, 122 F.3d at 1291 fig.1 (right).
228. L.A. Gear, 988 F.2d at 1123; Richardson, 597 F.3d at 1294; Berry Sterling, 122
F.3d at 1455.

001--MCKENNA & STRANDBURG_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

Fall 2013]

2/27/2014 9:55 AM

PROGRESS AND COMPETITION IN DESIGN

47

support a foot or reinforce the shoelace eyelets. Likewise, cups of a variety of
sizes and shapes can fit in car cup holders—indeed the designer in that case had
submitted three designs to Coca-Cola, all of which had the same basic bi-level
design.229 Coca-Cola rejected one because it thought it was “too short, too
squat, and too kind of square looking” and because it lacked “sex appeal”—all
clearly aesthetic aspects of the design.230 And the defendant in Richardson was
able to produce its own, very similarly functional tool despite clear aesthetic
differences between that tool and Richardson’s claimed design.231

Richardson’s “stepclaw” (left); Defendant’s tool (right)232

These examples demonstrate why the USPTO’s Manual of Patent
Examining Procedures specifically recognizes that “the utility and
ornamentality of an article may not be easily separable.”233 Copyright’s
conceptual separability test has encountered difficulties for the same reason.234

229. Berry Sterling, 122 F.3d at 1453.
230. Id.
231. The court in that case filtered out the functional elements and compared the

remaining aesthetic elements to the defendant’s tool, concluding that, while the Richardson
tool patent was valid, it was not infringed by the defendant’s design. Richardson, 597 F.3d at
1296.
232. Id. at 1291-92.
233. U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE § 1502.01 (8th ed. Rev. 9, Aug. 2012), available at http://www.uspto.gov
/web/offices/pac/mpep/s1502.html#d0e150263.
234. We are not, of course, the first to observe this. Indeed, several decades ago a
number of prominent copyright commentators lamented the difficulties associated with
trying to distinguish the creative or aesthetic features of industrial design and their useful
counterparts. See NIMMER, supra note 90, § 2.09[B][3]; Brown, supra note 107, at
1395-1404; Robert C. Denicola, Applied Art and Industrial Design: A Suggested Approach
to Copyright in Useful Articles, 67 MINN. L. REV. 707 (1983); Jerome H. Reichman, Design
Protection After the Copyright Act of 1976: A Comparative View of the Emerging Interim
Models, 31 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 267 (1984). Notably, those of that group who were
concerned that the separability analysis not be too rigorous were quite clear their hope for
copyright protection was animated by their view of the inadequacy of design patent
protection. See NIMMER, supra note 90, § 2.08[B][3] (“Unless and until special design
legislation is adopted, if the choice is full copyright protection or none at all, it may be that
the former alternative is preferable.”); Reichman, supra, at 350 (calling the failure to achieve
comprehensive short-term protection for the design of useful articles a “mutilation” that left
copyright with the separability test and no effective protection for the designs excluded from

001--MCKENNA & STRANDBURG_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

48

STANFORD TECHNOLOGY LAW REVIEW

2/27/2014 9:55 AM

[Vol. 17:1

The inherent duality of industrial design is also behind the Supreme Court’s
skepticism about trade dress for product configuration. Design patent law’s
“dictated by function” test appears to recognize that product designs often link
aesthetic and utilitarian aspects inextricably, but its solution to that difficulty is
to raise the functionality threshold so high that it permits design patents for
product designs that are primarily utilitarian in nature.
One significant thread of modern design theory suggests a possible solution
to this dilemma, though one that would require a reorientation of design patent
doctrine. Specifically, design patent law might be focused precisely on those
design elements that integrate the useful and the aesthetic—those that currently
bedevil intellectual property law precisely because they defy the binary
distinctions the law attempts to draw in each area. To be clear, we are not sure
that it is, in fact, appropriate to conceive of progress in integration of form and
function in cumulative terms, as we have argued is necessary for a patent
system. Nor are we sure that patent-like protection—or protection of any kind,
for that matter—is necessary to incentivize investment in better integrated
design.235 But we do argue that integration is the right focus for a design patent
system if we are to have one. First, conceiving of design patent protection in
terms of integration would better align design patent law with the goals of
many designers. Second, if it is possible to assess incremental improvement in
integration, then it might be possible to evaluate the obviousness of a design in
some coherent way. Third, this conception gives some basis for navigating
design patent law’s boundaries with other forms of IP protection. Fourth, and
finally, identifying a specific purpose for the design patent system would allow
us to ask fundamental questions about whether such protection is needed to
induce investment, and if so what the scope and duration of the protection
ought to be. As we suggested at the outset, it is impossible to ask whether we
need a design patent system until we know what such a system would be
needed for.
The goal of incentivizing designs that effectively integrate form and
function appears to be consistent with the way that at least some designers
themselves conceptualize their role.236 Thus, for example, the website of the
copyright as a result). Even Brown, who was more skeptical of design protection and more
inclined to support a competitive baseline of free copying, regarded design patent protection
as essentially meaningless. Times obviously have changed. Brown, supra note 107, at 1356
(calling design patents “a Cinderella who never goes to the ball”).
235. For one thing, designs of articles of manufacture are inextricably part of products
that are demanded, at least in part, for their utilitarian function. Producers of those articles
have strong incentive to make their products attractive to consumers so that consumers will
demand their products rather than those of their competitors. It is hard to imagine that
incentive disappearing if others copy the design—indeed copying may in many cases
increase the incentive to produce new designs, as it seems to do in fashion. See generally
KAL RAUSTIALA & CHRISTOPHER SPRIGMAN, THE KNOCKOFF ECONOMY (2012).
236. See Mueller & Brean, supra note 192, at 441-42.
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Industrial Designers Society of America describes industrial design as “creating
and developing concepts and specifications that optimize the function, value
and appearance of products and systems for the mutual benefit of both user and
manufacturer,” while “[t]he industrial designer’s unique contribution places
emphasis on those aspects of the product or system that relate most directly to
human characteristics, needs and interests,” applying “specialized
understanding of visual tactile, safety and convenience criteria.”237 While
designers are not driven by the kind of quantifiable metrics of improvement
that often motivate technological innovation, they do engage in research to
determine user preferences and needs, and to understand user experience with
existing products. They often look to earlier designs of similar products for
inspiration, though the most inspired designs often come from incorporating
ideas from far afield.238 Moreover, like the inventors of more traditional
technologies, they are constrained in their designs by the need to accomplish
utilitarian ends. Though there may be many possible ways to combine
aesthetics with function, there are not an infinite number.
It seems possible, then, though not certain, that industrial design is an arena
in which the cumulative progress notion underlying patent doctrine makes
sense. If so, it may be possible to build a coherent and socially beneficial
design patent system based on a requirement that a patentable design integrate
the aesthetic and utilitarian elements of an article of manufacture in a way that
would not have been obvious to a designer of ordinary skill in the art. Though
there may not be a “definitive test or metric” for evaluating the nonobviousness
of a design,239 definitive tests for nonobviousness are hard to come by even in
the utility patent arena. In any event, nonobviousness would make much more
sense in a design patent system based on integration of form and function than
it does in today’s muddled doctrine. The nonobviousness doctrine in a design
patent system reformed along these lines would also be likely to have more
bite, since we suspect that a fair amount of industrial design is sufficiently
incentivized by the first mover advantages of a competitive market. The
obviousness analysis almost certainly would look different from the Federal
Circuit’s permissive “primary reference” approach, which seems very far
removed from the way in which industrial designers go about devising designs

237. Fact Sheet, INDUS. DESIGNERS SOC’Y OF AM., at 3 (Mar. 15, 2012, 6:53 PM),
http://www.idsa.org/sites/default/files/IDSAFactSheet2013.pdf.
238. See Mueller & Brean, supra note 192, at 440. Mueller and Brean take this reliance
on far-flung sources as an argument against applying the analogous arts concept from
nonobviousness analysis in the utility patent realm. We see much less of a distinction. The
analogous arts doctrine rewards those who look to non-analogous sources of prior art in the
utility patent arena and it would seem no less appropriate to do so in the design patent arena.
The trick, of course, is to define “analogous arts” in a way that reflects the common practice
of inventors in the respective arenas.
239. Id. at 442.

001--MCKENNA & STRANDBURG_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

50

STANFORD TECHNOLOGY LAW REVIEW

2/27/2014 9:55 AM

[Vol. 17:1

that will integrate functionality and aesthetics.
A goal of promoting integration of form and function would structure the
analysis of functionality and other boundary doctrines. Design patents based on
nonobvious advances in integrating form and function could not be used to
circumvent the strictures of utility patent law, for example. Certainly design
patents would no longer be awarded to designs that merely combined utilitarian
features with ornamentation in obvious ways, even if that ornamentation was
highly creative and was not “dictated by function.” A design patent law focused
on the way in which designers build upon prior designs to produce better
experiences for product users also would not cover aesthetic aspects of useful
articles that were entirely unintegrated with utilitarian aspects. Like the very
first design patent case involving the rhombus-shaped ribbon reel, the doctrine
would reject patents on designs in which the relationship between aesthetic and
utilitarian aspects was “simply . . . arbitrary.”240 Features such as surface
ornamentation, for which the cumulative progress model of patent law is
inapposite, would be left to the copyright system, with all of its warts.
Indeed, conceiving of design patents in terms of integration of form and
function not only would give design patent law a clear domain in which it is not
purely redundant of some other form of IP, but it might even help bring some
coherence to copyright’s separability and trademark’s functionality doctrines. If
design patents are intended to promote cumulative progress in integration of
form and function, the right to copy unpatented industrial designs would be
reinvigorated. Copyright and trade dress protections would be subjugated to the
new design patent doctrine’s balance between the needs of current and future
designers, just as they currently are subjected to utility patent’s balance.
Copyright’s separability doctrine would have to be interpreted quite strictly to
avoid copyright intrusion into design patent terrain. Thus, copyright might be
available only for industrial designs with completely separable aesthetic
features—perhaps surface ornamentation, visual patterns on fabric, etc. The
approach to design patents suggested in this Article, if feasible, would reserve
such patents for features that, like those claimed in utility patents, are likely to
meet the Inwood standard for trademark functionality and unlikely to be merely
“incidental” or “arbitrary.” Thus trade dress protection would be available only
when the product configuration at issue not only indicated source, but also
could not be the proper subject matter of either a utility or design patent. The
“competitive necessity” approach to aesthetic functionality would apply at most
to conceptually separable aesthetic aspects of useful articles. An approach to
design patents based upon the integration of form and function would also
make sense of and clarify Wal-Mart’s distinction between product packaging
and product design, since improvements resulting from the interplay between
form and function are more likely to arise in the context of product design than
240. See Wooster v. Crane, 30 F. Cas. 612, 612 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1865) (No. 18,036).
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in the context of product packaging.241
Of course, we may not ultimately be able to base a sensible design patent
system on the goal of integrating form and function. It may turn out to be
impossible to define integration in a way that courts and the PTO can
operationalize. Or the task of determining whether a particular design integrates
form and function in a way that would be nonobvious to a designer of ordinary
skill in the art may prove to be too difficult or ill-defined. But, in our view, no
other coherent justification has been offered for a design patent system. If it
turns out that there is no workable measure of progress in integration, then our
analysis leads us to conclude that there can be no sensible design patent system.

241. Indeed, it is easy to think of changes in product packaging which have been
detrimental to consumer usability, as anyone who has attempted to open a shrink-wrapped
CD knows all too well.
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